Background

On 30 June 2022, the Cyberspace Administration of China (“CAC“) issued the Draft Provisions on Standard Contracts for the Export of Personal Information (“Draft Provisions“) for public consultation. The Draft Provisions open a lawful path for cross-border data transfers under Article 38 of the Personal Information Protection Law (“PIPL“). The deadline for feedback is 29 July 2022.

The Draft Provisions contain a draft Standard Contract for the Export of Personal Information (“PRC SCCs“), which we shall compare in detail below to the Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries under Regulation (EU) 2016/679  issued by the European Commission on 4 June 2021(those standard contractual clauses, the “EU SCCs“; and that regulation, the “GDPR“).

Note on the Terms used

We note that the lexicons used by the PIPL and GDPR vary somewhat. The terms we use to discuss the Chinese SCCs and EU SCCs (collectively or generally, “SCCs“) reflect the terms used in the PIPL and GDPR, respectively. A table of equivalent concepts is provided below:

PIPL GDPR
Personal Information Processor Data Controller
Entrusted Processor* Data Processor
Personal Information Protection Impact Assessment or PIPIA Data Protection Impact Assessment or DPIA
Personal Information Subject Data Subject
Sensitive Personal Information Special Categories of Personal Data
Overseas Recipient Data Importer
Regulator Supervisory Authority

*This is a concept that can be understood in the context of Article 21 of the PIPL but is not explicitly defined in the PIPL.

Use scenarios

The PRC SCCs may only be used in the following relevant cross-border transfer scenarios:

  • Non-critical information infrastructure operators;
  • The Personal Information Processor has handled the personal information of less than 1 million people ;
  • Since January 1 of the previous year, the cumulative amount of personal information provided overseas has not reached 100,000 people ;
  • Since January 1 of the previous year, the cumulative amount of sensitive personal information provided overseas has not reached 10,000 people.

For more information about relevant cross-border data transfers, please see China Releases Draft Standard Contract for Cross-border Data Transfers by Samuel Yang.

It is unclear if the PRC SCCs are customisable. However, Article 38 of the PIPL clearly states that contracts should be “in compliance with the standard contract provided by the national cyberspace authority…” Which could mean that the PRC SCCs should remain unchanged and be used as an intact document.

General observations

We note that the PRC SCCs consist of 9 articles and 2 appendices, while the EU SCCs consist of 18 clauses and 3 appendices. However, such a high-level comparison does not necessarily indicate the substance of either document.

The PRC SCCs can be considered a single document that applies to all relevant cross-border data transfers. They apply to all processors of personal information and do not define Entrusted Processors.

In contrast to the PRC SCCs, the EU SCCs can be considered 4 documents covering 4 different cross-border data transfer scenarios. Those transfer scenarios are: controller to controller; controller to processor; processor to processor; and processor to controller. Users of the EU SCCs require some familiarity with its layout as use requires the selection and deletion of clauses to match the transfer scenario.

Direct Comparison

We have produced the table below to help readers understand the structures of the PRC SCCs and EU SCCs. The table matches various topics identified within each document to specific provisions.

Topic PIPL SCCs GDPR SCCs AnJie’s Comments
Definitions and interpretation. Article 1

Clause 1.

Clause 4.

The PRC SCCs provide 7 definitions and a catch-all. Some definitions refer directly to the PIPL, while others are China-specific. For instance, “Relevant laws and regulations” refers to Chinese laws and regulations only.

While the EU SCCs lack a specific definitions section, Clause 1 therein contains some generic definitions found in most agreements, while Clause 4, an interpretation clause, refers readers to the GDPR for terms defined there.

One thing to note is that Entrusted Processors, a concept that is defined in the context of Article 21 of the PIPL, are not described or referred to in the PRC SCCs. To express this in GDPR terms, the Chinese SCCs do not explicitly recognise the existence of Data Processors.
Sensitive personal information and special categories of personal data Article 1. Module One, Clause 8.6.

The EU SCCs provide an explicit definition without cross-references to the GDPR, while the PRC SCCs refer to the definition under the PIPL.

We note that the relevant definitions under the PIPL and GDPR vary significantly, with the PIPL employing an open risk-based definition (PIPL, Article 28) and the GDPR employing what appears to be a very narrow and closed definition limited by examples.

In practice, this means that sensitive personal information under the PRC SCCs will include other things that are not included in the EU SCCs. For instance, your bank details are not special categories of personal data under GDPR but would be sensitive personal information under the PIPL.
Transparency. Article 2, Item 2

Module One, Clause 8.2.

Module Two, Clause 8.3.

Module Three, Clause 8.3.

The PRC SCCs require personal information processors to inform Personal Information Subjects about the particulars of all overseas recipients.

In contrast, the EU SCCs only explicitly require Data Controllers to inform Data Subjects about the particulars of an overseas recipient where the said recipient is another Data Controller.
Data minimisation. Article 2, Item 1. Module One, Clause 8.3.

Under the PRC SCCs, the burden of ensuring data minimisation is on Personal Information Processors that act as transferors. In contrast, the EU SCCs appear to only burden Data Controllers that act as Data Importers.

Placing the obligation on the party that initially controls that information seems to be a better way of controlling the risks associated with such transfers as a Data Importer cannot abuse data they lack. However, to manage this potential conflict in legal obligations, we imagine that, in the near future, many PRC-EU DPAs will include mutual commitments concerning data minimisation.
Personal Subject or Data Subject (collectively or generally, “Subject”) rights.

Article 2, Item 3.

Article 2, Item 8.

Article 3, Item 2.

Article 5.

Article 6, Item 1.

Clause 3.

Module One, Clause 8.3.

Module Three, Clause 8.3.

Clause 10.

Subject rights vary between the PRC and the EU. Additionally, Subject rights under the PRC SCCs are enforceable against both parties, while under the EU SCCs, the matter of enforceability depends on the nature of the underlying cross-border data transfer scenario.

Both SCCs require a recipient to provide notices or information on its website detailing the contact details for a person who can handle inquiries and how enquiries should be handled.

Both SCCs treat Subjects as third-party beneficiaries with a right to view the relevant SCCs. Moreover, both SCCs allow the principal contracting parties to charge fees or refuse to comply with unreasonable Subject requests.
Due diligence on the recipient. Article 2, Item 4 Clause 8.

Personal Information Processors must, under the PRC SCCs, “use reasonable efforts” to ensure that “the overseas recipient can fulfil its obligations“.

Likewise, the EU SCCs require a Data Exporter to use “reasonable efforts to determine that the data importer is able, through the implementation of appropriate technical and organisational measures, to satisfy its obligations…”

The use of a reasonable efforts standard by both SCCs is interesting. We note that other parts of both SCCs stipulate best efforts standards, suggesting that the due diligence standards of care are lower than those for other matters.
Secure processing.

Article 2, Item 4.

Article 3, Item 5.

Module One, Clause 8.5.

Module Two, Clause 8.6.

Module Three, Clause 8.5.

Module Four, Clause 8.2.

Generally, the provisions of both SCCs aim to bring about the same or similar outcomes, namely appropriate technical and organisational measures. While the EU SCCs elaborate more on things that should be considered to bring about such outcomes, such additional details are arguably unnecessary.

Concerning access controls, there appears to be broad equivalence between the SCCs. However, the PRC SCCs explicitly require Overseas Recipients to have “a minimum authorised access control policy…”

 
Provision of laws and technical standards. Article 2, Item 5. N/A Personal Information Processors must provide Overseas Recipients with a copy of “relevant legal provisions and technical standards” upon request. This does not appear to have an equivalent within the GDPR. Should the exercise of such a right occur in practice, we imagine that foreign recipients might need translations. Procuring such translations, especially technical standards, could be expensive in practice. Contracting parties should consider this in their pricing and negotiations.
Cooperation with regulatory authorities and acceptance of their oversight.

Article 2, Item 6.

Article 3, Item 12.

Module One, Clause 8.9.

Clause 13.

Under the PRC SCCs, both contracting parties agree to respond to the Regulator’s enquiries. Moreover, the Overseas Recipient must agree to cooperate with the Regulator’s inspections, obey the Regulator and provide them with proof that “necessary actions have been taken.” We imagine the PRC SCCs could cause issues if EU blocking statutes exist (which we understand is the case).

Under the EU SCCs, the Data Importer only agrees to make documents available to the Supervisory Authority. While this requirement is less onerous than that found under the PRC SCCs, we note that under the Data Security Law, Article 36, “Any organisation or individual within the territory of the PRC shall not provide any foreign judicial body and law enforcement body with any data stored within the territory of the PRC without the approval of the competent authority of the PRC.“
Impact assessment.

Article 2, Item 7.

Article 4.

 Clause 14.

The PRC and EU SCCs require a transferring party to conduct impact assessments for cross-border data transfers. Whilst the obligations of the SCCs do not wholly align, we believe that, in practice, a single assessment form or template could be used to ensure compliance with both sets of SCCs.

As the GDPR and EU SCCs predate the PIPL and the PRC SCCs, we expect that many such forms or templates will likely be variations of styles used in the EU.
Compliance and record keeping.

Article 2, Item 9.

Article 3, Item 10-12.

Module One, Clause 8.9.

Module Two, Clause 8.9.

Module Three, Clause 8.9.

Module Four, 8.3

Under the PRC SCCs, Personal Information Processors are burdened with proving that they have fulfilled their contractual obligation. In the case of disputes between the contractual parties, it is unclear if this would function as a reverse burden of proof. However, such a reverse burden of proof could exist in disputes with Subjects.

Overseas Recipients under the PRC SCCs must provide Personal Information Processors with evidence of their compliance, access to files and documents, facilitate audits, and accept the Regulator’s supervision. Overseas recipients must retain their records for at least 3 years.

Under the EU SCCs, obligations vary depending on the cross-border data transfer scenario, but in all cases involve being able to demonstrate compliance (sometimes to the other party) and making documents available to the regulator upon request. Modules Two to Four require recipients to facilitate audits and, for Modules Two and Three only, specify that audits may occur onsite.
Transfer particulars.

Article 3, Item 1.

Appendix 1

Clause 6.

Clause 8.1.

Annex I.

Annex II.

 Both SCCs rely on an Appendix or Annex to state the particulars of a specific cross-border transfer. They are broadly comparable, except that the PRC SCCs require a clear statement on the quantity of personal information transferred and suggest using the personal information categories listed in recommended national standard GB/T35273.
Access by government authorities at destination. Article 3, Item 7. Clause 15.

The EU SCCs describe how to handle legally binding requests or demands from foreign authorities with jurisdiction over personal information in the destination country. This is a prudent measure to help entities manage conflicting legal systems.

Unfortunately, the PRC SCCs contain no explicit provisions about dealing with legally-binding requests or demands from foreign authorities with jurisdiction over personal information in the destination country. We note that there is an express and general prohibition against providing “personal information to third parties located outside the PRC.” This could cause issues in practice and might deter entities from transferring their data abroad.
Data retention and deletion.

Article 3, Item 4.

Appendix 1.

Module One, Clause 8.4.

Module Two, Clause 8.5.

Module Three, 8.5.

 The provisions under both SCCs are broadly comparable with the exception that, under the PRC SCCs, an Entrusted Processor who is an Overseas Recipient must provide an audit report after deletion or anonymisation.
Data breaches. Article 3, Item 6.

Module One, Clause 8.5.

Module Two, Clause 8.6.

Module Three, Clause 8.6.

Module Four, 8.2.

Under the PRC SCCs, the requirements for handling all data breaches involve taking remedial measures, “immediately” notifying the Personal Information Processor and the Regulator, notifying Subjects if required by law, and documenting all facts about breaches. We do not believe that “immediately” is to be taken literally. However, some industries in China, such as insurance,  have reporting requirements that can be as short as one hour. As such, the meaning of immediately should not be assumed, and a service level agreement may be desirable for some industries.

Obligations concerning data breaches under the EU SCCs can vary depending on the cross-border data transfer scenario and risk level. For instance, transfers between Data Controllers attract the most onerous obligations in the event of high-risk data breaches. In contrast, transfers from Data Processors to Data Controllers only require the Data Processor to notify and assist the Data Controller.
Onward transfers. Article 3, Item 7.

Module One, Clause 8.7.

Module Two, Clause 8.8.

Module Three, Clause 8.8.

There are transparency requirements for onward transfers under the PRC and EU SCCs. See above for more details.

To make an onward transfer under the PRC SCCs, the following conditions must exist: (i) the transfer is necessary, though what that entails precisely is unclear at this time; (ii) the transfer is disclosed to Subjects and, if necessary, with their consent; (iii) the transfer must be subject to a written agreement that provides protection not lower than the standards in PRC law and the assumption of joint and several liabilities for harm to Subject; and (iv) a copy of the onward transfer agreement must be provided to the Personal Information Processor.

Under the EU SCCs, onward transfers much be subject to the EU SCCs or to “a country benefitting from an adequacy decision“, a third party that ensures appropriate safeguards. The transfer is necessary for litigation purposes, or the transfer is required to protect the vital interests of others.
Entrusted Processing & Data Processors. Article 3, Item 8. Modules Two, Three and Four. This is a significant area of divergence as the PRC SCCs does not significantly distinguish between types of entity that process personal information, while the EU SCCs treat Data Controllers and Data Processors very differently depending on the cross-border data transfer scenario.
Sub-processors.

Article 3, Item 8.

Appendix 1.

Clause 9.

Annex III.

Both SCCs seem to allow for sub-processing. However, the PRC SCCs do not explicitly address this particular issue, which means that sub-processing would be treated like any other onward transfer.

As for the EU SCCs, they require sub-processors to be bound by “in substance, the same data protection obligations as those binding the data importer” and allow for (i) specific prior authorisation or (ii) general authorisation from a list.
Automated decision-making. Article 3, Item 9. Clause 10.

Under the PRC SCCs, automated decision-making must be transparent, fair, and equitable. It may not be used to apply unreasonable differential treatment in terms of transaction conditions.

Under the EU SCCs, automated decision-making that produces effects concerning a subject or significantly affecting them may not occur unless the Subject consents to such processing or it is permitted under laws with appropriate safeguards.
Choice of law and jurisdiction.

Article 6, Items 2-5.

Article 9, Item 2.

Article 9, Item 5.

Article 9, Item 6.

Clause 11.

Clause 17.

Clause 18.

The EU SCCs stipulate the law of an EU member state or, for Data Processor to Data Controller Arrangements, the laws for a country that allows for third-party beneficiary rights. It gives jurisdiction to the courts of an EU member, including the place where a Subject habitually resides.

The PRC SCCs stipulate Chinese law.

If a Subject, as a third-party beneficiary to the contract, brings an action, they must comply with the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China to determine jurisdiction, meaning a Chinese court with jurisdiction will be selected.

In the case of the contracting parties, the contract allows for dispute resolution in a Chinese court with jurisdiction or an arbitral institution in a country that is a member of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
Termination and suspension. Article 7. Clause 16.

Under the EU SCCs, if the Data Importer breaches its obligations, the Data Exporter may suspend the contract until the breach is remedied or the contract is terminated. Several types of breaches or circumstances may trigger termination.

Under the PRC SCCs, Overseas Recipients have similar rights to Data Exporters under the EU SCCs, while Personal Information Processors enjoy 2 additional grounds: (i) breach by the Overseas Recipient of the laws in the country where it is based; (ii) bankruptcy, dissolution or liquidation. Additionally, termination may also occur at the election of either party if a Regulator has issued a decision that makes execution of the contract impossible or if both parties agree to the termination.
Liability for breach of contract. Article 8 Clause 12.

Under the PRC SCCs, “Liability between the parties is limited to the damages suffered by the non-breaching party.” At face value, this appears to exclude liability for lost profits.

Under both SCCs, Subjects are entitled to claim damages as third-party beneficiaries. Where more than one party causes a breach of Subject rights, both are jointly and severally liable to the Subject.
Precedence. Article 9, Item 1. Clause 5. Both SCCs claim to have precedence in the event of a conflict. This could cause difficulties in the event of a dispute involving both the EU and PRC.
Docking clause. – Clause 7. No such mechanism exists under the PRC SCCs, which appear to be drafted for a scenario involving 2 contracting parties. Such a mechanism would be desirable for more complex processing scenarios.
Other matters agreed by the parties. Appendix 2 – The PRC SCCs contain a blank page at their rear. This suggests that the CAC expects contracting parties to have additional needs. However, based on current cross-border data transfer practices, we suspect the PRC SCCs will function as an appendix or annex rather than the main agreement.

Implications

The PRC SCCs bear some similarities with the EU SCCs but differ on some key points. Multinationals with operations in the PRC and EU that wish to rely on SCCs may need to find ways to deal with those differences and conflicts or find alternative legal paths for their cross-border data transfers.

The likely alternative for many multinationals would be to obtain “certification of personal information protection” that has been “given by a professional institution in accordance with the regulations of the national cyberspace authority” under Article 39 of the PIPL. The National Technical Committee on Information Security of Standardization Administration (also known as “TC260”) has recently issued guidance on achieving such certification but more clarity is needed on things such as who are those “professional certification institutions” and how to start the certification journey.

Finally, for those who are able to use the PRC SCCs, we have observed that many multinationals annex the EU SCCs to their own customised global data transfer agreements, and we suspect the same will happen to the PRC SCCs in time.

Nearly fourteen years after its current Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) came into effect, China spares no efforts in strengthening antitrust enforcement and tightening relevant rules and regulations. Following the unprecedented Alibaba fines and a series of sector guidelines, that effort culminated this week, when the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) passed a new AML of amendments (“New AML”) to the current AML, with a few revisions to the previous draft (“Previous Draft”, together with an even earlier draft by State Administration for Market Regulation, the “Draft AML Amendment”) issued on 23 October 2021. Although a bill of law usually takes three rounds of deliberation before passage in China, it is possible to have a piece of legislation passed after two rounds where consensus could be achieved among relevant stakeholders; the New AML appears to be such an exception.

Beyond all doubt, the New AML, once becomes effective, will better arm the newly-established State Anti-Monopoly Bureau for a more challenging decade ahead. Having codified the current Chinese practices and adopted some foreign experience, the New AML aims to keep up with developments and market conditions that have transformed the way businesses are operated these days. While e-commerce and platform economy receive the most attention, sectors including people’s livelihood, finance, technology, and media are also highlighted. For many others, the new AML, while providing clearer procedure guidance, will take away the filing thresholds of safe harbour and impose harsher penalties for violations; antitrust and competition compliance will be put on the agenda, if not yet, for many undertakings, particularly those in key sectors.

I. The Main Aspects of the Draft AML Amendment

  • Focus on platform economy:Out of fear of the competitive expansion of tech giants, it is universally acknowledged that legislative actions need to be taken to address the perceived enforcement gaps between the old school antitrust rules and the new types of anti-competitive conduct that emerged in the digital era. After the 2021 Guidelines for Anti-Monopoly in the Field of Platform Economy (“Platform Guidelines”), the New AML provides both some general terms that prohibits the increasingly aggressive application of the abuse of dominance by platform entities and tailored clauses that list the exact forms of such conducts.
  • Tougher penalties with broadened targets: To secure the deterrence effects of the new AML, the New AML and Draft AML Amendmentpropose to increase the maximum level of fines for the relevant violations, especially gun-jumping, non-implementation of monopoly agreements and behaviours led by trade associations. Although the penal sum varies among different drafts, the final number set in the New AML is still several times of that under the current AML. Remarkably, the New AML creates a punitive penalty which multiplies fines by up to two to five times of the original penalty where the violation is serious. Those that do not generate any revenue in the previous financial years, too, cannot escape. In addition, it intends to impose liabilities on facilitators as well as legal representatives and the person in charge of or directly responsible.
  • Weakening stance against RPM: Distinct from its European and American counterparts, resale price maintenance (“RPM”) has long been an enforcement priority in China with a dichotomy method adopted by antitrust enforcers and Chinese courts; the Chinese antitrust enforcement authorities take the “prohibition + exemption”, a semi-per se illegal approach and Chinese courts choose a road that is akin to rule of reason. While the Supreme People’s Court of China attempted to justify the difference in its renowned Yutaijudgement, the New AML clearly discloses the Chinese policymakers’ preference toward the rule of reason approach by putting the burden of proof on the concerned undertakings to show that it does not eliminate or restrict competition and repositioning the definition of “monopoly agreement”.
  • Official introduction of safe harbour rules for monopoly agreements: Although safe harbour is not a new thing in China’s antitrust practice, previously it can only be found in some sector guidelines; the New AML now recognises the legitimacy of such block exemption in vertical agreement ina higher-level of law; details of the implementation rules, are yet to be established by the enforcement authority.
  • Expansion of the enforcement authority’s jurisdiction:Concerns over concentrations involving undertakings, notably in the digital or pharmaceutical sectors, that have or may have anti-competitive impacts in the relevant markets, albeit with limited income, have grown in the past few years. The New AML tries to fill the gap by conferring on enforcer authority to review transactions that fall below filing thresholds.
  • Establishment of a “stop-the-clock” mechanism:Currently, notifications filed in China have to be pulled and refiled after a maximum of 180 days review period; this process can be repeated in complicated cases, especially the ones approved with conditions. The New AML draws lessons from other jurisdictions and introduces the ‘stop-the-clock’ mechanism to suspend the review process under certain circumstances.

II. An In-Depth Look at the New AML

While largely in line with the previous draft, some proposed amendments, considering opinions from different sides, made under the New AML are novel; the detailed revisions are explained as follows:

  • Erosion of safe harbour:In the Previous Draft, a safe-harbour clause is introduced to provide a higher-level legal basis for exempting certain agreements, horizontal and vertical alike, with concerned parties’ market share lower than (unspecified) thresholds set by enforcement authorities. However, the New AML now limits the application of safe harbour to vertical agreements alone, which are usually considered to be less anti-competitive than horizontal agreements among competitors. That said, the safe harbour clauses under existing sector guidelines remain valid. The change implies a cautious and stringent position taken by the legislator.
  • Further refinement of platform economy rules:China makes no secret its ambition to tackle platform giants. A clause is included under the general provisions in the Previous Draft to prohibit undertakings from abusing data, algorithms, techniques, capital advantages and platform rules to eliminate or restrict competition. Despite the existence of the Platform Guidelines, the New AML further specifies some platform-specific anti-competitive conduct which mirrors the Platform Guidelines, on top of the general prohibition clauses under the chapter of abuse of dominance responding to the intensified antitrust scrutiny trend in the past year.
  • Soft landing of “killer acquisition” investigation:Some stakeholders and scholars suggested the rules for reviewing transactions falling below filing thresholds should be further clarified. The New AML addresses this by allowing the enforcement authority to request the parties to transactions to file; the enforcement authority shall initiate an investigation if the parties fail to do so. This rule should benefit both transaction parties and enforcement authorities; the parties will have more mobility while the enforcer could save constrained enforcement resources.
  • Altered enforcement authority:To reflect the elevation of the seniority of the market regulator’s antitrust unit, the State Anti-monopoly Bureau, the New AML now specifies the antitrust enforcement authority of the State Council to assume the power thereunder. The deputy ministerial-level enforcement authority, will now have more tools in its kits to carry on its duty.
  • Interplay between the judiciary and law enforcement:While the current AML and earlier versions of its draft amendment are almost enforcement-exclusive, the New AML supplements a general clause that requires the reinforcement of antitrust judicial activities and a fair and efficient approach by courts in hearing antitrust cases. It also calls for improving the interplay between the judiciary and law enforcement.

III. Looking Ahead

On 24 June 2022, the Standing Committee of the NPC officially passed the much-awaited AML Amendment. The potential impact on the competition landscape of the new AML, together with its supplementary rules, would be wide-ranging. Harsher penalties, expanded jurisdiction, altered procedures and standards are reasons why the new AML merits close attention from undertakings doing business in China and related to China; we will keep our clients apprised of any further updates.

 

What is Director and Officer Liability Insurance?

Directors and officers (“D&Os”) assume liability for many of their company activities, especially when their company is publicly listed. In many cases D&Os face significant legal exposure based simply on their signature, role and title, or status as a controlling person. This means that no matter how effectively, carefully, or in good faith their decisions are made, D&Os face the risk of being sued.

D&O insurance is designed to cover this risk. Namely, to protect executives, directors, as well as the companies they serve, against liability arising from actions taken in the course of doing business or managing the companies. This can include the legal costs and damages from being sued by plaintiffs or prosecuted by regulators, the costs of settling such actions, or other forms of liability.

D&O insurance first emerged on the Lloyds of London insurance market in the 1930s and while not mandatory, it is common with private and publicly traded companies alike.

With the listing of more and more Chinese companies in foreign markets, an increasing number of such companies now acquire D&O insurance. Within mainland China, due to revisions to the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China and ensuing securities litigation, D&O insurance has also captured the attention of Chinese D&Os.

How Does Director and Officer Liability Insurance Work

When a crisis hits, a typical D&O policy covers both the corporate entity in addition to individual D&Os. Possible areas of coverage include insurance for investigations, tax liability, securities, and employment claims. Among these potential sources of liability, securities claims tend to raise the greatest exposure.

When a securities claim arises, D&Os are designed to cover “wrongful acts”. Depending on the language in D&O policies, this typically covers the kinds of mistakes, poor judgment, or negligence that lead to shareholder litigation. However, these “wrongful acts” normally do not include D&Os’ intentional or fraudulent acts.

What are the Limitations of Liability Insurance for D&Os?

D&O insurance does not cover against all types of liabilities. A number of exclusions exist to limit insurer liability, which can greatly affect coverage and settlements of shareholder litigation. Conduct exclusions exist to prevent benefits for intentional wrongdoing, like a criminal or fraudulent act, (including fraud on the market). In some cases, inappropriate conduct can lead to termination of coverage. Many policies also include a “prior knowledge” exclusion, which prevents claiming losses from lawsuits involving matters D&Os knew or should have known about prior to litigation. In some cases, the exclusion can only be triggered by a judicial ruling (“final non-appealable adjudication”, or some variant thereof).

In China, there is fierce debate over whether D&O covers losses resulting from government penalties. Decision-makers within China’s insurance market hope for court precedent that could clarify this issue, especially with regards to proper application of the insurable interest in D&O insurance.

What Laws Govern Chinese D&O Liability Insurance?

Chinese entities raising funds through IPOs abroad increasingly turn to PRC insurers for their D&O insurance needs. In many cases, such entities earn their revenue in China but are structured as a variable interest entity (“VIE”) headquartered in a tax haven such as the Cayman Islands or British Virgin Isles. When a foreign securities claim arises, these policies become notable in that they typically engage both Chinese and foreign law.

This leads to insurance policies that are veritable chimeras — a Cayman head (which might face bankruptcy proceedings following a fraud on the market claim), a Chinese body (governing the policy itself), and an American tail (for example, governing settlement allocation when a class action settles). To illustrate, whereas nowadays most securities litigation is heard before US district or state courts in New York, Chinese D&O policies usually set an arbitration center in Beijing or Shanghai as the forum for policy disputes, with PRC law as the governing law.

This can lead to extremely complex proceedings, where disagreements arise on how a Chinese court or tribunal should determine allocation of damages under US law. Oftentimes, Chinese arbitration of D&O claims involves US lawsuits where multiple defendants decide to settle with the plaintiffs. This leaves important issues of allocation unresolved, with no foreign court having definitively determined the portion of liability for each defendant, only some of whom are the insureds or covered under the D&O policy. Therefore, in addition to the underlying Chinese laws, it is crucial to also grasp rules surrounding the applicable laws of the jurisdiction where the VIE is headquartered and where the insured entity is listed, especially US securities laws.

Conclusion

Like their common law precursors, Chinese D&O policies protect against securities claims, including when D&Os commit “wrongful acts”. However, this cover does not extend to fraudulent or criminal conduct, and policies may also exclude wider categories of behaviour.

Importantly, litigating these policies rarely relies on only the laws of one jurisdiction, due to the fact that Chinese D&O policies typically interact with Chinese, US, and even Cayman or British Virgin Islands laws governing a VIE’s incorporation. They are instead more like chimeras, and far more complex than US publicly-listed companies’ domestic D&O policies.

AnJie’s insurance team

Ranked Band 1 by Chambers for insurance, AnJie is well known for its insurance & reinsurance practice. AnJie’s insurance team, as one of the largest in China, is composed of more than 50 seasoned, multilingual Chinese lawyers and foreign legal advisors. AnJie’s insurance partners are located in the firm’s Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Haikou, and Nanjing offices, providing legal services to our clients across the nation and beyond. Since 2013, AnJie and its insurance team partners have been continuously recognized as Key Recommended Law Firms and Lawyers by leading international rating agencies and professional publications such as Chambers and Partners, Who’s Who Legal, Legal500, and Asialaw.

[1]Some policies also include fees for crisis management, including emergency consulting and public relations services.

AnJie Partners Zhan Hao and Song Ying were once again invited to pen the China chapter for Global Legal Insights: Cartels 2022 (“Cartels 2022”), which has been published recently. Cartels 2022, published by the Global Legal Group (“GLI”), aims at providing global legal professionals with an overview and insights into the laws and practices relevant to cartels (referred to as “monopoly agreements” in China) in different jurisdictions.

Based on the relevant rules and enforcement practices of monopoly agreements in China, Zhan Hao and Song Ying, who were recommended as antitrust and competition attorneys by Chambers & Partners, Who’s Who Legal, the Legal 500 and other leading rating agencies, introduced in detail the regulatory framework, general legal system and typical monopoly agreements cases from 2020 to 2022, deeply analyzed the latest enforcement policy, administrative investigation process and compliance standards, and shared insights together with their outlook on future legislative and enforcement developments.

GLI is a leading global legal media organization providing legal analysis and industry solutions to top corporate executives, legal counsel, law firms and government agencies worldwide, and has been an important platform for the international legal community to connect and share. The invitation to the AnJie antitrust team for many years is a recognition by the market of its strength in the field and pushes the team to continue to lead the way in the antitrust and competition law profession.

Foreign investor seeking to exit from its foreign invested enterprises (including joint venture companies and wholly foreign owned companies) (“FIE”) in China may consider transferring all its shares in the FIE to others, requesting the FIE to return capital by reducing the FIE’s registered capital or voluntary dissolution of the FIE. This article will focus on the introduction of voluntary dissolution under the current Chinese legal mechanism.

The dissolution of a FIE used to be a time-consuming and complicated procedure according to the previous laws and practice. However, in the wake of promulgation of several policies and regulations, the dissolution procedure has been simplified as the required time and costs are significantly reduced. In the recent FIE dissolutions that we have helped with, it took approximately 3 to 5 months to complete the entire process.

The entire process of voluntary dissolution is generally comprised of three major procedures, namely dissolution, liquidation and deregistration as follows:

  1. Dissolution
  • Resolutions on Dissolution and Liquidation Committee Formation

The dissolution shall commence upon its highest authority (normally the shareholders’ meeting or the sole investor) adopting a resolution on the voluntary dissolution.  Pursuant to the Company Law, the resolution regarding dissolution shall be approved by shareholders representing at least two-thirds of the voting rights. That been said, we understand according to the articles of association of most FIEs, dissolution must be approved by all shareholders unanimously.

The resolution regarding the dissolution shall state (i) the cause of the dissolution (for example, expiration of operation term, serious loss or revoking of business license by government); and (ii) the formation of a liquidation committee, as well as the appointment of members and principal of the liquidation committee.

The laws do not provide for any requirement on the members and principal of the liquidation committee. Normally, the committee is comprised of 2 to 3 members including 1 principal; the principal can be the chairman of board or the general manager, while other members may include directors and finance head of the FIE. The shareholders of the FIE may also designate external legal counsel or accountants to be the members of the liquidation committee. If the FIE is a joint venture company, each shareholder would better appoint its own representative to the liquidation committee.

  • Announcement of Formation of Liquidation Committee

The FIE should then announce to the public the formation of the liquidation committee and the information about the members of the liquidation committee through the national enterprise credit information publicity system within 10 days of the liquidation committee’s establishment.

  1. Liquidation

In accordance with the Company Law, the day on which the liquidation committee is formed is the commencement date of the liquidation. The liquidation committee should carry out the following liquidation activities since then:

  • Notification to Creditors

The liquidation committee should notify creditors within 10 days of its formation. In addition, the liquidation committee should additionally make a public announcement via the national enterprise credit information publicity system within 60 days of its formation. The purpose of both the direct notification and the public announcement is to request the FIE’s creditors to register their rights with the FIE for settlement.

  • Inventorying of Assets (including Existing Contracts)

The liquidation committee should run an inventory of all remaining assets and existing contracts, and then prepare balance sheets and property inventories. The liquidation committee may engage an appraiser to appraise the assets to build up value basis for disposal of the assets later.

In order to save costs and time spent on the liquidation procedure, it is advisable for FIE to start to dispose assets and terminate the business contracts even before the FIE enters into the dissolution and liquidation procedures

  • Termination of Employment of Employees

The FIE shall notify its employees of the decision and shall discuss with them in respect of the termination date and the severance payment on a timely and transparent basis.

To facilitate implementation of liquidation, the FIE may want to maintain one or two staffs who are familiar with the financial situations of the FIE until the completion of the liquidation procedure, because he/they will be required to assist the liquidation committee to handle the liquidation works, especially balance sheet preparation, assets disposal and tax clearance.

  • Preparation of Liquidation Plan

After the liquidation committee clearly understand the status of the FIE’s assets and creditor’s rights and indebtedness (including the ones arising from employment and business contracts), the liquidation committee shall prepare a liquidation plan setting forth, among other things, liquidation expenses and costs, taxes to be paid, list of creditor’s rights and indebtedness, list of assets, disposal plan for assets and indebtedness, plan of termination of employment.

The liquidation plan is not required to be filed with the governmental authority but shall be approved by the FIE’s shareholders.

  • Implementation of Liquidation Plan

Once the liquidation plan is approved by the shareholders, the liquidation committee shall carry out the liquidation as per the plan.

The account balance and the proceeds from the disposal of the assets must be used to settle outstanding costs and debts in the following order:

  • liquidation expenses;
  • employees’ salaries, social insurance fees and severance fees;
  • outstanding taxes; and
  • other indebtedness.

Please be advised that tax clearance is usually the most complicated and time-consuming step in the entire liquidation procedure. As soon as the liquidation starts, the liquidation committee shall apply for a pre-review of the outstanding liabilities to the tax bureau. The tax bureau would issue a “One-Time Notice of Tax Matters” setting forth all the outstanding tax liabilities owed by the FIE. The liquidation committee should settle these liabilities one by one according to the notice. In the course of this process, the FIE shall be prepared to answer questions in relation to the balance sheet and/or make up taxes in arrears as per tax bureau’s requests.

  • Liquidation Audit

Since the foreign exchange administration will require the liquidated FIE to provide a liquidation audit report when it distributes remaining fund to foreign shareholders, the liquidation committee shall engage a qualified auditor to conduct an audit and issue an audit report.

  • Liquidation Report

After the tasks above have been completed, the liquidation committee shall prepare a liquidation report setting forth, among the other things, the situation and the result of the actual implementation of the liquidation plan. The liquidation report needs to be approved by the shareholders and submitted to the registration authorities for recordation.

  1. Deregistration

After the liquidation, the FIE shall carry out the following deregistration with various relevant governmental authorities:

  • deregistration with corporate registration authority;
  • social insurance deregistration;
  • housing fund deregistration;
  • deregistration of enterprises for foreign exchange receipts and payments for trade of goods; and
  • deregistration with customs.

These de-registration processes are often relatively simple and straightforward. The liquidation committee can normally complete the processes by only submitting a few application forms to the relevant authorities or filling out forms online.

In addition, after the completion of the deregistration with the corporate registration authority as mentioned above, the FIE will need to handle the following matters simultaneously at its bank in order to distribute the remaining fund to the FIE’s foreign shareholders:

  • cancellation of foreign exchange registration with the foreign exchange administration;
  • provision of the “Notice of Company Deregistration” issued by the corporate registration authority and the liquidation audit report issued by auditor; and
  • closure of the bank accounts after the remaining fund has been distributed.
  1. Conclusion

In the circumstances where a FIE encounters deadlock between shareholders, lack of market competitiveness, significant increase in expenses and costs or regulatory obstacles, voluntary dissolution may become an inevitable exit option. A more effective and streamlined dissolution mechanism has been adopted by the recent laws and practices. A FIE can be dissolved and deregistered within a period much shorter than the time required under the previous mechanism; and the documents required for dissolution and deregistration become less. Despite of the simplification, foreign investor seeking exit via voluntary dissolution still needs to ensure its strict compliance with the procedures set forth in the applicable regulations as failing to do so, it would expose itself to several and joint liabilities towards the FIE’s indebtedness.

* * *

Please contact the authors listed below if you request additional information or have any questions regarding the issues raised in this brief:

Simon Li

Liting Ren

 

+86 10 8567 2989

 

 +86 10 8531 1450

lixiameng@anjielaw.com

 

 renliting@anjielaw.com

 

This publication has been prepared for clients and professional associates of AnJie Law Firm.

While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, this publication is not an exhaustive treatment of the area of law discussed and AnJie Law Firm accepts no responsibility for any loss occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication.  Please seek the services of a competent professional advisor if advice concerning individual problems or other expert assistance is required.

 

In December of 2021, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China published the Draft Revision to the Company Law of China (the “Draft Revision”).

The Draft Revision has made significant changes to the current Company Law which was promulgated in 1993, after which being revised for several times with the latest revision in 2018 (the “Current Company Law”). The changes are mainly reflected in the following aspects:

  • improvements to capital contribution system;
  • relaxing consent requirements for equity transfer;
  • optimization of corporate governance;
  • imposing more responsibilities on directors, supervisors and senior management; and
  • simplification of companies’ exit process.

The Draft Revision, if passed and implemented, would bring profound influence on not only domestic companies but also foreign invested companies as the Foreign Investment Law coming into force in 2020 has already brought the foreign investment regime in line with the Company Law.

In this article, we will highlight some of the noteworthy changes made by the Revision Draft to the Current Company Law, especially those regarding the limited liability companies, which have long been seen as the most common vehicles for foreign investors who engage in businesses in China.

  1. Improvements to Capital Contribution System
  • Equity Interests and Creditors’ Rights are Expressly Accepted to be Used as Capital Contribution

According to the Current Company Law, shareholders may make capital contributions in cash, in kind, or in intellectual property right, land use right, or other non-monetary properties which can be assessed with value and of which the ownerships can be transferred. The Draft Revision, on this basis, expressly adds two more non-monetary properties, namely equity interests and creditors’ rights, which could be used as capital contribution.

Using the equity interests and the creditors’ rights as capital contribution is not prohibited by law at present, but it is not expressly recognized by any law either. The Draft Revision first ever recognize these two kinds of methods for capital contribution at the level of law. The transactions in the forms of equity swap and debt-equity conversion would be given more solid legal basis. On the other hand, it should be noted that the equity interests and the creditors rights being used as the capital contribution shall strictly follow the assessment requirements which are also imposed on the other non-monetary properties.

  • Accelerated Maturity for Shareholders’ Capital Contribution Obligation is Introduced

In principle, China now adopts the subscription registration system for the registered capital, which means that the shareholders may subscribe their respective capital contribution first and then are obliged to pay in full the amount of their subscribed capital contributions within a term agreed by the shareholder(s). The laws in general do not provide for a mandatory deadline for the capital contribution. However, the Draft Revision introduces an accelerated maturity mechanism, under which if a company is unable to pay off any of its indebtedness and it becomes obviously insolvent, the company or its creditors shall be entitled to request the shareholders who have subscribed but not yet made the capital contribution to pay the capital contribution immediately, no matter whether the agreed term of capital contribution of such shareholders has expired or not. Shareholders would then be exposed to the risks of acceleration of their capital contribution responsibilities, where they intend to subscribe capital contribution first and make actual contribution in the future according to a time schedule.

  1. Relaxing Consent Requirements for Equity Transfer

According to the Current Company Law, where a shareholder intends to transfer his equity interest to anyone other than the shareholders of the company, he is required, as a prerequisite, to obtain the consent of more than half of the other shareholders (a shareholder shall be deemed to have consented to the transfer if he fails to reply within 30 days after it receives the notice of the said equity transfer, or if he objects to the equity transfer but refuses to purchase the equity interest proposed to be transferred). Only if such prerequisite has been satisfied, the said equity could be transferred while the other shareholders have the right of first refusal on such equity interest. The Draft Revision takes out such prerequisite of obtaining the consent before equity transfer, while keeping the right of first refusal of the other shareholders. In other words, the transferring shareholder before the proposed transfer only needs to notify the other shareholders; and he can transfer the equity even if the other shareholders object but decide not to exercise the right of first refusal.

This mechanism provided by the Draft Revision is relatively simpler, and shareholders have more freedom in carrying out equity transfers in practice. However, a company, especially a limited liability company, is established and maintains on the basis of trust and willingness of corporation of the shareholders. Lack of control over transferring shareholders’ transfer may adversely impact non-transferring shareholders’ interests and the company’s interests. The lawmakers may have considered this side effect. Therefore, the Draft Revision allows shareholders to negotiate and agree upon tailored restrictions (e.g. consent requirements) on proposed equity transfer and to add them in the company’s charter documents with binding effects.

  1. Optimization of Corporate Governance  
  • Settings regarding Directors and Board are Adjusted

Firstly, the Draft Revision adjusted the concept of the “executive director”. According to the Current Company Law, small-scale limited liability companies may have one executive director instead of setting up board of directors. The executive director, as provided in the Current Company Law, may concurrently serve as the manager of the company. The Draft Revision stipulates that small-scale limited liability companies may only have a director (such position is not named as “executive director”) or a general manager to take the role of a board of directors. The position of “executive director” in the Draft Revision is exclusively set for joint stock limited companies. The “executive director” in the Draft Revision refers to the director concurrently taking the role of daily management of the company, which is the counterpart of the “non-executive director”.

Secondly, the Draft Revision no longer sets out any specific functions and powers of the board as the Current Company Law does; instead, it only states that the board shall exercise the functions and powers other than those of the shareholders’ meeting granted by the law. Accordingly, the shareholders will have greater discretion in designing and allocating the functions and powers of each level of the corporate governance of the company by articulating them in the charter documents.

  • Position of Supervisor is No Longer Mandatorily Required

According to the Current Company Law, the companies must set up a board of supervisor, or at least have one or two supervisors. The Draft Revision proposes that a company may choose to set up an audit committee underneath the board which shall be composed of the directors, responsible for supervising the company’s finances and accounting; if the company choose to do so, it will not be required to set up the position of supervisor.

  • Functions and Powers of General Manager are Adjusted

Like the adjustment made to the functions and powers of board of directors, the Draft Revision does not set forth any specific functions and powers ascribed to general managers, but uses a more general stipulation instead, which only states that the general managers shall exercise the functions and powers in accordance with the articles of association or as authorized by the board of directors.

  • Control over Related Party Transaction is Strengthened

The Draft Revision requires that the following parties shall disclose their interests in the proposed transactions (if any) to the board or shareholders when the transactions are submitted for their deliberation and decisions:

  • directors;
  • senior managers;
  • supervisors;
  • close relatives of directors, supervisors and senior managers;
  • enterprises controlled directly or indirectly by directors, supervisors and senior managers or their close relatives; and
  • the others in related relationship with the directors, the supervisors and the senior managers.

The Draft Revision also requires the relevant directors to excuse themselves from voting process on these transactions. All these requirements are not stipulated in the Current Company Law.

  1. Imposing More Responsibilities on Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management

The Draft Revision imposes stringent obligations on directors, supervisors and senior managers in safeguarding the company’s capital. They will be held accountable in the following circumstances:

  • shareholders fail to pay the capital contribution in full and on time, or the actual value of the non-monetary property as the capital contribution is significantly lower than the subscribed capital contribution, and the directors, supervisors and senior managers know or should have known such misbehaviors but fail to take necessary measures;
  • shareholders illegally withdraw their registered capital after the incorporation of the company, and the directors, supervisors and senior managers know or should have known such misbehaviors but fail to take necessary measures;

In addition, if

  • any profit is distributed to shareholders in violation of law; or
  • the registered capital of the company is reduced in violation of law,

the responsible directors, supervisors and/or senior managers shall have indemnification liabilities.

The Draft Revision also brings forward that if directors and senior managers in performing his duties have caused any damage to any parties due to his intentional acts or gross negligence shall bear joint and several liability with the company.

As stipulated in the Draft Revision, if controlling shareholder or ultimate controller of a company takes advantage of its influence on the company to instruct any director or senior manager to engage in the acts that harm the interests of the company or the shareholders and causes losses to the company or shareholders, such controlling shareholder or ultimate controller of the company shall bear joint and several liability with the director or the senior manager.

  1. Simplification of Companies’ Exit Process  

The rules of simple de-registration process for the company with no outstanding debts are set out in the Draft Revision. Compared to the general de-registration process, in the simple de-registration process, the steps such as the establishment of the liquidation committee and the serving of notice to creditors are not required, and the prescribed announcement period is shortened from forty-five days to twenty days.

Please note even if the company is de-registered through the simple de-registration process, the shareholders shall guarantee the de-registered company has no outstanding debt and shall undertake to bear joint and several liability for any debts of company which arise before the de-registration. As a consequence, the shareholders would bear heavier risks under the simple de-registration process.

* * *

The Draft Revision has made a series of substantive changes to the Current Company Law. However, it is still not clear when the revised Company Law would be officially promulgated and to what extent the changes made in the Draft Revision would be reflected in the final version eventually taking effect. No information is available up to now about whether any grace period will be given for the existing companies to adjust according to the revised Company Law after it is promulgated, and what penalty would be if the companies fail to make the adjustments.

We will continue to closely monitor the development and inform you of any progress regarding the revisions to the Company Law.

Please contact the authors listed below if you request additional information or have any questions regarding the issues raised in this brief:

Simon Li

Linda Gao

 

+86 10 8567 2989

 

 +86 10 8567 5913

lixiameng@anjielaw.com

 

 

 gaojialin@anjielaw.com

 

This publication has been prepared for clients and professional associates of AnJie Law Firm.

While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, this publication is not an exhaustive treatment of the area of law discussed and AnJie Law Firm accepts no responsibility for any loss occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication.  Please seek the services of a competent professional advisor if advice concerning individual problems or other expert assistance is required.

Key Issues:

  • What are the criteria for determining a horizontal monopoly agreement?
  • Will a settlement agreement reached by the parties to settle a patent dispute constitute a monopoly agreement?
  • Should the motive, purpose and context of the contracting parties be considered in determining monopoly agreements?
  • Can the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) determine a settlement agreement is void that has been found valid by the People’s Court in another case, based on the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”)?

Preamble

Recently, AnJie Law Firm’s (“AnJie”) attorneys represented the appellant, a power equipment company, in a horizontal monopoly agreement dispute concerning “transformer changer” that heard by the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme Court (“IP Court of the SPC”). AnJie successfully obtained a verdict in the second instance, which reversed the first instance judgement and invalidated the settlement agreement in question as it violates AML. [Docket No.: (2021) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 1298, A Horizontal Monopoly Agreement Dispute Concerning Transformer Changer]. In this case, the agreement in question is a settlement agreement entered by the parties to settle a patent dispute in another case. In the hearing, the IP Court of the SPC particularly examined whether a patent dispute settlement agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement and what are the criteria for determining a monopoly agreement, among others.

In the “Interview on the Third Anniversary of the Establishment of the IP Court of the SPC” published by People’s Daily Online on February 28, 2022, ZHU Li, the Deputy Chief Judge of the IP Court of the SPC, particularly remarked on the case when presenting the work of the IP Court of the SPC since its establishment: “in the case of a horizontal monopoly agreement dispute concerning transformer changer, the court determined the settlement agreement in question constituted a horizontal monopoly agreement and therefore the whole agreement was void. The Court has strictly regulated the acts of restricting the production quantity or sales volume of commodities, dividing the sales market or the raw material supply market, fixing or changing the price of commodities in the guise of an “patent infringement settlement agreement.”

Horizontal monopoly agreement is a core violation strictly regulated by AML in many jurisdictions. In the judicial and administrative enforcement practice in China, there have been a number of cases involving horizontal monopoly agreements. However, this case should be the first one in China’s anti-monopoly litigation to discuss in detail whether a settlement agreement in a civil litigation constitutes a monopoly agreement, how the elements of a horizontal monopoly agreement should be determined, and how to solve the conflict between the adjudicative documents of the previous patent dispute and that of the latter anti-monopoly civil litigation.

I. Case Background and Hearing

1. Case Background

In this case, the plaintiff, a power equipment company (“PEC“), and the defendant, a transformer charger company (“TCC“), are both engaged in the production and sale of transformer tap changers and are competitive operators. in 2015, TCC filed a lawsuit in the People’s Court (“Patent Lawsuit“) on the ground that the technical features of the shielding cover product of a certain type of transformer tap changer (“Transformer Charger“) produced and sold by PEC fell into the scope of protection of the rights of a certain patent right held by it. TCC requested the court to order PEC to cease the production of such product and compensate for its economic losses.

During the trial of the patent infringement dispute, PEC applied to China National Intellectual Property Admission for a declaration of invalidity of the patent right in question and applied to the court hearing the case for a stay of the trial. In 2016, TCC and PEC entered a settlement agreement. Thereafter, TCC applied for the withdrawal of the Patent Lawsuit, and PEC applied for the withdrawal of the request for invalidation of the patent right involved.

2. Main Contents and Performance of the Settlement Agreement

The main contents agreed by the parties in the settlement agreement involved in the case are as follows:

  • The transformer charger in question was divided by type, and it was agreed that except for one type of the transformer charger in question, PEC shall not manufacture or commission any third party (or purchase from it) other than TCC to manufacture all other types of transformer charger bodies and related parts in question. Meanwhile, PEC shall be the overseas market agent for TCC’s shareholding company, and undertakes not to manufacture on its own in the overseas market, nor to act as agent for similar products of other enterprises.
  • For the quotation of the transformer charger involved in the case entrusted to TCC, PEC should first confirmTCC’s price of main part of transformer charger before deciding the quotation by itself, and then quote the price to TCC with the purchase of the main part. In addition, the parties agreed that, for substitutable imported chargers and special chargers, if one party informs the other party of the price information, the transaction price of the informed party cannot be lower than that of the actively informed party.
  • If PEC breaches the above agreement, it shall compensate TCC all losses incurred therefrom and separately pay a high amount of liquidated damages.

After the parties reached the settlement agreement involved in the case, PEC did not fulfill the said agreement, and TCC filed a lawsuit to the People’s Court in January 2017 on the ground that PEC had violated the settlement agreement by selling the transformer charger involved in the case to a third party. TCC requested the court to order PEC pay liquidated damages. In this contract dispute case, the People’s Court of the first and second instance both found the settlement agreement in question was legal and valid, without examining whether the settlement agreement in question violated the AML. After the above judgment came into effect, the People’s Court of the first instance initiated the enforcement of the effective judgment of the case and enforced the execution money from PEC.

In June 2018, TCC again filed a lawsuit with the People’s Court on the ground that PEC had breached the settlement agreement by selling the transformer charger in question to a third party, and requested PEC to pay liquidated damages. During the trial of the case, PEC applied to suspend the trial on the grounds that the validity of the settlement agreement in question was disputed and filed a separate lawsuit accordingly. In June 2019, the trial court ruled on suspension of the trail.

3. Litigation Procedure and Holding

In May 2019, PEC filed a lawsuit with the People’s Court (“Court of First Instance“), requesting to confirm that the settlement agreement in question was void due to its violation of the AML and that TCC should compensate PEC for economic losses and reasonable expenses for the litigation. After hearing the case, Court of First Instance issued a judgment in December 2020, holding that the settlement agreement did not violate the AML and dismissing all PEC’s claims.

PEC appealed to the SPC against the trial judgment, requesting that the trial judgment be reversed and that all of PEC’s claims in the trial be upheld instead. After hearing the case, the SPC issued a judgment in February 2022, holding that the relevant provisions of the settlement agreement in question constituted a horizontal monopoly agreement by restricting the production quantity or sales volume of commodities, dividing the sales market or the raw material supply market, fixing or changing the price of commodities which are expressly prohibited by Article 13(1) of the AML, and that the settlement agreement in question was void.

As mentioned above, the agreement that PEC sued to confirm as void due to the violation of AML was a settlement agreement entered between it and TCC in another case to settle their patent dispute. During the trial of this case, the Intellectual Property Court of the SPC focused on the issues of whether the context of the agreement signed affected the determination of the monopoly agreement; whether the settlement agreement reached in the patent dispute constituted a monopoly agreement; and the elements of a monopoly agreement. The Court’s analytical approach is worth studying.

II. Approach to Determining Whether a Settlement Agreement Reached as a Result of a Patent Dispute Constitutes a Monopoly Agreement

1. The core criterion for determining a monopoly agreement is whether it has the effect of excluding or restricting competition, and the context in which the agreement was entered into is only a reference factor

(1) Court of First Instance: The settlement agreement in question was signed for the purpose of settling patent infringement disputes, not for the purpose of restricting market competition, and should not be deemed as a monopoly agreement

The court of first instance held that the purpose of the settlement agreement was to resolve the patent infringement dispute between the parties and to avoid the recurrence of that dispute, and that the settlement agreement did not aim to induce the parties to enter into an alliance to compete in the competitive market. On this basis, the Court of First Instance, after analyzing the terms of the agreement and the effect of its performance, held that the terms of the settlement agreement in question did not have the attributes of a monopoly agreement and should not be deemed as a monopoly agreement.

In this regard, PEC appealed that AML regulates the acts that exclude or restrict competition in the market, and neither the circumstances that constitute horizontal monopoly agreement, which are explicitly prohibited by the law in the form of enumeration, nor the factors that should be considered in determining other circumstances that constitute horizontal monopoly agreement, mentioned the context or subjective purpose of the parties to reach the agreement. Therefore, it was an error in the application of the law to hold that the settlement agreement in question did not constitute a horizontal monopoly agreement based on the context of its conclusion.

(2) The Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme Court: To determine whether the settlement agreement in question constitutes a monopoly agreement, the core criterion should be whether the agreement has the effect of excluding or restricting competition. The context in which the agreement was signed is not sufficient to determine or deny how the settlement agreement in question influences market competition

The IP Court of the SPC held that according to Article 13(2) of the AML, a monopoly agreement is an agreement, decision or other concerted act to exclude or restrict competition. Therefore, whether the agreement reached between operators is a monopoly agreement prohibited by AML should be based on the core criterion of whether the agreement has the effect of excluding or restricting competition. The context of the settlement agreement and the subjective motives of the parties in entering into the settlement agreement are only reference factors, and it is not sufficient to determine or deny the effect of the settlement agreement on market competition.

2. The scope of the patent settlement agreement exceeds the scope of protection of patent rights and/or the dispute involved, which in fact pursues the effect of excluding or restricting competition and violates AML

(1) Court of First Instance: The settlement agreement in question restricts the production and sale of specific types of products by the parties to the agreement, in order to avoid falling into the scope of protection of the rights of the patentee, and should not be deemed as a monopoly agreement

The Court of First Instance held that the commitment of PEC to produce only one type of transformer charger in the settlement agreement in question was because other types of transformer chargers might fall into the scope of protection of the patent right in question, and therefore the terms of the relevant agreement were to avoid being sued again for patent infringement and should not be deemed as a monopoly agreement.

In this regard, PEC appealed, claiming that the aforementioned determination of the trial judgment had omitted facts, and that the scope of the agreement in the settlement agreement in question far exceeded the scope of protection of the rights of the patent in question and the scope of dispute in patent infringement cases, which had the obvious effect of excluding and restricting market competition and constituted a horizontal monopoly agreement.

(2) The IP Court of the SPC: The settlement agreement in question lacks substantial relevance to the scope of protection of the patent right in question, and the agreement has the effect of excluding and restricting competition and constitutes a horizontal monopoly agreement

The IP Court of the SPC held that the settlement agreement in question lacked substantial relevance to the scope of protection of the patent right of correction in question, and that its core did not lie in the protection of the patent right, but in the exercise of the patent right as a cover, in fact pursuing the effect of horizontal monopoly agreement, which was an abuse of patent right and violated the provisions of AML. Specific bases include:

  • The technical effect of the patent right in question mainly lies in reducing the manufacturing cost of the charger and enhancing the stability and reliability of the use of the charger, which belongs to the improvement of the transformer charger in question and is not a basic patent that cannot be avoided. The scope of protection of the patent right in question does not involve the specific shape or type of the transformer charger in question, while the settlement agreement in question divides the product by the type of the transformer charger.
  • In overseas markets, the settlement agreement in question divides the products into chargers produced by the transformer charger company’s participating companies and chargers produced by other companies, limiting the scope of chargers produced by PEC, but this limitation is not substantially related to the scope of protection of the patent in question.
  • The settlement agreement in question divided the market in which the transformer charger in question was located, and in doing so, restricted the sales price, production quantity, sales quantity, sales type and sales territory of the products covered by the agreement, which excluded and restricted competition among operators.

In addition, the IP Court of the SPC also pointed out that since the settlement agreement in question was not substantially related to the scope of protection of the patent right in question, and the content of the settlement agreement in question exceeded the disputed content of the patent infringement dispute, whether the products involved in the settlement agreement in question included the products suspected of infringing the patent right in the patent infringement dispute did not, in principle, affect the judgment of whether the settlement agreement in question constituted a monopoly agreement.

3. The standard of review of monopoly agreements specified in this case is the same as the standard of anti-monopoly review of reverse payment agreements in another Supreme Court case

It is worth mentioning that on December 17, 2021, the Supreme Court ruled on the application for withdrawal of appeal in the case of AstraZeneca v. Jiangsu Aosaikang Pharmaceutical [Docket No.: (2021) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 388] and made the first preliminary anti-monopoly review of the “reverse payment agreement for pharmaceutical patents.”

In the case, the disputed agreement is the settlement reached between the third-party Bristol -Myers Squibb (“BMS”) and Jiangsu Vcare PharmaTech Co., Ltd (“Vcare”) to settle the patent dispute in respect of “Saxagliptin”. In accordance with the settlement, Vcare shall withdraw the request for patent invalidation within five days from the effective date of the settlement, and BMS and the subsequent patentee (AstraZeneca in the case) undertake not to claim responsibility of any action of Vcare and its affiliates (Aosaikang in the case) which infringe the disputed patent after January 1, 2016 (the duration of the disputed patent right will expire on March 5, 2021).

Vcare withdrew the request for invalidation after the reaching of the settlement, and its affiliate Aosaikang applied for registration, manufactured, used, authorized for sale and sold Salagliptin tablets after the aforesaid agreed date. AstraZeneca filed a lawsuit to the Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province (“Nanjing Intermediate Court”), accusing that Aosaikang infringed its patent. The Nanjing Intermediate Court held that Aosaikang, as an affiliate of Vcare, is entitled to exploit the disputed patent pursuant to the settlement, and dismissed all claims of AstraZeneca. AstraZeneca filed an appeal to the SPC, but applied to withdraw the appeal later on the basis of the settlement with Osaikang.

In the process of reviewing the withdrawal of the appeal application, the IP Court of the SPC found that the Settlement Agreement in question was in line with the appearance of a “drug patent reverse payment agreement”, i.e. the drug patent right holder promises to compensate the generic applicant for direct or indirect benefits (including disguised compensation such as reducing the generic applicant’s non-benefits), and the generic applicant promises not to challenge the validity of the drug-related patent rights or delay entering the market of the patented drug. The applicant promises not to challenge the validity of the patent right of the drug or delay the entry into the market of the patented drug. The IP Court of the SPC pointed out that the arrangement of such agreements is generally special and often hidden, which may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition and may constitute a monopoly agreement regulated by the AML, and the core judgment criterion is whether the agreement in question is suspected of excluding or restricting competition in the relevant market.

In this case, the IP Court of the SPC clarified the analysis path for the antitrust review of the “reverse payment agreement for pharmaceutical patents”: by comparing the actual situation where the agreement was signed and fulfilled with the hypothetical situation where the agreement was not signed or fulfilled, the focus was on the possibility of the generic applicant’s invalidation request not being withdrawn. The possibility that the patent right related to the drug is invalidated by the invalidation request, and then use it as a basis to analyze whether and to what extent the agreement in question has caused competitive harm for the relevant market.

In AstraZeneca v. Aosaikang, and the horizontal monopoly agreement dispute case concerning transformer changer, the parties entered into the disputed agreements for the same background, that is, for the purpose of settling patent disputes. The core standard adopted by the IP Court of the SPC in determining whether the concerned agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement in the two cases is the same, i.e., whether the relevant agreement has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. The analytical approach adopted by the IP Court of the SPC in the two cases may also be applied or referred to in determining whether other settlements of patent disputes executed under other circumstances constitute monopoly agreements.

III. Other Important Legal Issues

1. To determine whether an agreement constitutes a horizontal monopoly agreement explicitly listed in AML, a comprehensive analysis of the agreement, rather than a mechanical comparison between the agreement and the law, shall be adopted.

As to whether the settlement agreement in question constitutes a horizontal monopoly agreement, the IP Court of the SPC held that, in determining whether the agreement in question conforms to the forms of horizontal monopoly agreements listed in Article 13(1) of AML, it is not appropriate to compare the content of the agreement with the five types of horizontal monopoly agreements listed in the same paragraph, but to analyze the content of the agreement as a whole from the perspective of market competition order, and to consider the content of the relevant provisions of the agreement and their relevance, and the actual or potential effects of excluding or restricting competition. The agreement should be analyzed as a whole from the perspective of the market competition order, and the content and relevance of the relevant provisions of the agreement, and the actual or potential effect of the exclusion or restriction of competition should be considered comprehensively.

Upon a comprehensive analysis of the content of the settlement agreement, the IP Court of the SPC held that the settlement agreement in question agreed on the terms of stopping the production of specific varieties of goods, limiting the sales of specific varieties of goods, coordinating and fixing prices, and reinforcing the effect of dividing the sales market, limiting the production and sales quantities of goods, and fixing the prices of goods by means of information liaison and penalties for breach of contract. Therefore, the relevant provisions constitute horizontal monopoly agreements to restrict the quantity of commodity production, divide the sales market and fix commodity prices, which are expressly prohibited by Article 13 of AML, and the settlement agreement in question is invalid in its entirety.

2. The principle of “per se violation” applies to horizontal monopoly agreements explicitly listed in the Anti-monopoly Law, and the burden of proof should be on the defendant that the agreement in question does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.

The first instance judgment found that the settlement agreement in question, if performed, did not have the monopoly effect regulated by Article 13 of AML, and held that the electric PEC should bear the burden of proof that the performance of the settlement agreement in question might lead to the monopoly effect. In this regard, PEC appealed and claimed that the settlement agreement constituted a horizontal monopoly agreement under Article 13(1) of AML and that the “per se violation principle” applied and that PEC did not need to provide evidence to prove its competitive effect; on the contrary, TCC should bear the burden of proof that the agreement did not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition. Therefore, the trial verdict was wrong in allocating the burden of proof.

The IP Court of the SPC pointed out that, according to Article 7 of the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Cases of Civil Disputes Arising from Monopoly Acts” (“Judicial Interpretation of Civil Disputes on Monopoly”), the five types of monopoly agreements expressly listed in the Article 13(1) of AML, including restricting the production quantity or sales volume of commodities, dividing the sales market or the raw material supply market, fixing or changing the price of commodities, are typical horizontal monopoly agreements that have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. Once formed, such agreements generally have the actual or potential effect of harming market competition, unless the defendant can prove that the agreement has the effect of promoting competition and that the effect exceeds its effect of excluding or restricting competition.

Specifically in this case, the IP Court of the SPC held that the relevant burden of proof in the first instance judgment was improperly allocated and should be corrected. PEC had proved that the settlement agreement in question constituted a horizontal monopoly agreement to limit the quantity of production of goods, divide the sales market and fix the price of goods as prohibited by Article 13(1) of AML. Therefore, the burden of proof should be on TCC to prove that the settlement agreement in question does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition. Since TCC did not have sufficient evidence to prove that the settlement agreement in question had the effect of promoting competition and that the effect exceeded its effect of excluding or restricting competition, the settlement agreement in question should be found to have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.

3. If a party to a monopoly agreement claims reasonable expenses from other parties to the agreement for investigating and ceasing the monopoly, the people’s court will analyze the case on a case-by-case basis

In this case, PEC claimed that the settlement agreement was invalid, and TSC should bear the compensation therefrom. PEC, therefore, claimed that TSC should compensate PEC for economic losses and reasonable expenses for safeguarding rights. With respect to the economic losses claimed by PEC, the IP Court of the SPC took the same view as the monopoly dispute case of “Brick and Tile Association” [Docket No.: (2020) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 1382] it handled previously, that is, a participant in a horizontal monopolistic agreement has no right to claim compensation. Therefore, the IP Court of the SPC did not support the economic losses claimed by PEC.

The IP Court of the SPC, while rejecting the request of the electric equipment company regarding the compensation of economic losses, supported the request of the electric equipment company regarding the compensation of reasonable expenses for the maintenance of rights in this case, on the following explicit basis:

  • Article 14(2) of the Judicial Interpretation of Civil Disputes on Monopolies provides that “upon the plaintiff’s request, the people’s court may include the reasonable expenses paid by the plaintiff for investigating and stopping the monopoly in the scope of compensation for damages.”
  • The reasonable expenses claimed by PEC for the defense of its rights in this case are the expenses for hiring a lawyer for this lawsuit. PEC filed a lawsuit requesting to confirm that the settlement agreement in question was invalid due to the violation of AML, and requested damages, and the attorney’s fees it claimed to have spent for this lawsuit were expenses paid to stop the monopoly.
  • Although the request for damages is not supported, in view of the fact that horizontal monopoly agreements are usually hidden, the support for reasonable expenses is conducive to the initiative of the participants of the monopoly agreement to reveal the monopolistic behavior, which helps to timely discover and stop the monopolistic behavior, protect fair competition in the market and maintain the order of market competition, so the reasonable expenses claimed by PEC in this case will be considered.
  • Considering the complexity of this case and the participation of the attorney representing PEC in this litigation, the reasonable expenses claimed by PEC are still reasonable.

The decision of the IP Court of the SPC in this case makes it clear that, after a horizontal monopoly agreement is reached, although a party to the monopoly agreement has no right to claim damages from other participants of the agreement in accordance with AML, a party to the monopoly agreement may claim reasonable expenses paid to other participants of the agreement for investigating and stopping the monopoly, and the People’s Court may support it according to the specific situation.

4. The parties have filed a contract dispute lawsuit and a monopoly dispute lawsuit against the same agreement, which do not constitute repeated litigation

After the settlement agreement in question was reached, TCC filed contract dispute lawsuits in 2017 and 2018 on the ground that PEC did not fulfill the settlement agreement by selling the transformer charger in question to a third party. In the two contract dispute lawsuits and the transformer charger horizontal monopoly agreement dispute cases, the parties filed lawsuits based on the settlement agreement in question, and in the 2017 contract dispute case, the effective judgment has determined that the settlement agreement in question is legal and valid, and TCC has obtained the liquidated damages through the execution procedure.

Therefore, for the transformer charger horizontal monopoly agreement dispute case, it involves the question of whether the prior contract dispute case and the monopoly dispute case constitute “repeated litigation”. According to the opinion of the IP Court of the SPC in another ruling, since the legal relationship and the subject matter of the lawsuit are different, the transformer charger horizontal monopoly agreement dispute does not constitute a duplication of litigation with the prior contract dispute case.

In the monopoly agreement dispute case of Shangqiu Longxing Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v, Hubei Tuosi Medical Co., Ltd. [Docket No.: (2021) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Xia Zhong No.187] heard by the IP Court of the SPC on August 19, 2021, the focus of dispute between the parties was whether the monopoly agreement dispute case and the contract dispute case with an effective ruling that has been previously heard by a people’s court constitutes repeated lawsuits. In the case, the IP Court of the SPC ruled that, as contract dispute case and monopoly agreement dispute case of the same contract involve a contractual legal relationship and anti-monopoly legal relationship respectively. They have different subject matters. Even if the parties involved are the same or the claim of the later case substantially negates the ruling of the former case, they do not constitute repeated lawsuits. However, it is appropriate in principle that these cases should be jointly tried by one court.

IV. Cases in Foreign Jurisdictions, Insights and Practical Significance of this Case

1. Cases in Foreign Jurisdictions: How to Determine Whether a Reverse Payment Agreement Violates AML

In patent disputes, the parties often settle the case by settlement. However, whether the settlement or settlement agreement of the relevant patent dispute will violate AML has become a key issue of concern for the antitrust enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the United States, the European Union and jurisdictions, and the issue has gradually been addressed in the judicial practice in China.

The EU has established its own review discourse (including the analysis of purpose limitation and effect limitation) through relevant cases (especially the reverse payment case), which can be found in the Lundbeck reverse payment case and the Servier reverse payment case. The Lundbeck reverse payment case, due to its similarity to the transformer charger horizontal monopoly agreement dispute, was included in the compilation of cases prepared by the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration, which was provided as a reference material to the panel of the Supreme Court in the second trial proceedings.

The U.S. courts have developed in judicial practice an antitrust analysis model based on the per se violation principle and the reasonableness principle for such monopoly agreement cases. On this basis, for the sake of efficiency, the principle of expedited review has been developed on the basis of the traditional principle of reasonableness, which is a simplified principle of reasonableness. In response to the conflict between patent law and antitrust law embodied in reverse payment agreement cases, the courts have also specifically applied the special patent scope test principle.

Among other things, the patent scope test principle emphasizes the consideration of the exclusivity of patent rights when conducting antitrust review of reverse payment agreements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Federal Court of Appeals have used the patent exclusivity test, taking into account the legislative purpose and standards of the patent and antitrust laws.

The purpose of the settlement agreement is determined by categorizing whether the settlement agreement is in the context of a “patent infringement litigation settlement” and applying the different principles of review described above.

  • If the settlement agreement is in the context of a patent infringement litigation settlement, the rules of the exclusive scope of patent rights test apply. Assuming that the patent in dispute is valid, determine the scope of protection of the rights of the patent in dispute and the scope of exclusivity of the agreement, compare the two scopes, and determine whether the agreement exceeds the scope of protection of the patent rights. If it exceeds, it constitutes monopoly; if it does not, it does not constitute monopoly.
  • If the settlement agreement is not in the context of a patent infringement litigation settlement, it is judged mainly on the basis of the antitrust law, and the principle of reasonableness, the principle of per se violation, and the principle of expeditious review are applied by situation according to the analysis of the reasonableness of the provisions of the settlement agreement for restrictive conduct and the impact on competition.

In general, the exclusive scope of patent rights test rule takes into account the unique nature of pharmaceutical patent antitrust litigation in reverse payment and enables judges to apply it in a way that more fully takes into account the scope of patent rights protection in their decisions.

In summary, the U.S. court’s analysis of whether a “reverse payment” agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement is summarized as follows:

Analysis Principles Judgment Logic
Principle of per se violation Some of the reverse payment agreements are themselves agreements that only have the effect of restricting competition (e.g., horizontal market division agreements), which can be directly ruled as a violation of the antitrust law.
Reasonable Principle First determine whether a restriction of competition is both economic and efficient; and if so, whether it can be further found to be reasonable and justified.
Expediated Review Principles （The presumption (through common sense) that a reverse payment agreement that clearly prevents competition is illegal can be rebutted by defense and proof, after which the judge must conduct a full and reasonable analysis.
Patent Scope Test Principles Reverse payment agreements do not violate antitrust laws when the anticompetitive effects of the agreement do not extend beyond the patent rights.

 

It should be said that the above-mentioned extraterritorial cases and doctrines are worthy of our consideration.

2. Insights and Practical Implications of this Case: Antitrust Compliance Recommendations in Patent Settlement

This adjudication by the Supreme Court is well reasoned and logically clear, giving a clear judicial view on some key frontier issues, and the determination of the monopoly agreement strictly follows the intent of AML, while also incorporating domestic and international judicial and law enforcement practices, reflecting the level of adjudication by the highest judicial authority in China in civil anti-monopoly litigation.

Antitrust and patents are a pair of long-standing entangled legal issues, and the antitrust risks faced in patent settlement agreements are enormous. AnJie provides the following compliance advice for companies’ reference in practice:

  • In the process of negotiating with a competitor for settlement of a patent dispute, attention should be paid to the necessity and confidentiality of the scope of information exchange, especially in relation to competitively sensitive information such as the cost, price or customers of the product (or technology), to avoid being found to have committed a violation of AML when other evidence is combined (e.g., having increased the price of the product at the same or similar time as the competitor).
  • The restrictive clauses agreed in the settlement agreement should be strictly examined to confirm whether the relevant content exceeds the scope of protection of the patent right in question and/or the scope of the dispute, especially for the content of the clauses involving restrictions on the use, production and sale of certain types of products by the parties to the agreement, such as whether the scope of products agreed to be produced by the infringing party necessarily fall within the scope of protection of the patent in question.
  • Analyze, with the assistance of in-house professionals or external legal counsel, whether the content agreed to in the settlement agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement and/or an abuse of dominant market position, especially whether the relevant content may go beyond the scope of protection of patent rights and/or the scope of the dispute.
  • For the settlement agreement reached in the patent right litigation procedure, according to the specific circumstances of the case, companies may apply to the People’s Court to confirm the validity of the settlement agreement. People’s Court will make a ruling to confirm the validity of the settlement agreement after examination.

 

*Thanks Caili ZHAN and Chenyi WANG for their contributions in English translation.

On March 1, 2021, DAWKINS, a professional rating agency of Accurate Media, officially released the ranking of China’s top ranked law firms and top ranked lawyers in its A Client’s Guide 2022 Edition. AnJie Law Firm has made the list in 6 sectors, including VC, PE, overseas listing, consumption, high-tech and new economy. Attorney Cai Hang, partner of AnJie, is recommended in the sectors of VC, high-tech and new economy, and Attorney Guo Jinglian, partner of AnJie, is recommended in the sector of overseas listing.

China Business Law Journal, a well-known international law journal, published the Deals of the Year 2021 on February 22, 2022. With its constant reporting of the China market, China Business Law Journal selected the deals that stand out as the Deals of the Year 2021, in terms of the overall significance, complexity, and innovative nature of the deals and cases, as well as deal size.

Five projects represented by AnJie win Deals of the Year 2021 of China Business Law Journal, covering the sectors of Investment & Financing, M&A, IP, Bankruptcy Reorganization, Capital Market, New Energy, Insurance, and Internet Technology.

Founder Group’s USD11bn restructuring（CATEGORIES: Bankruptcy reorganisation）

KEY POINTS: Under the guidance of the State’s major strategies of encouraging insurance funds to support the development of the real economy and promoting the reform of university-run enterprises, an investor consortium comprising Ping An Life Insurance, Zhuhai Huafa, and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Development Group participated in the RMB69.7 billion merger and reorganization of Founder Group and four other companies. The consolidated new Founder Group, set up with retained assets, is majority-owned by Ping An. The judicial reorganization of Founder Group is one of the largest bankruptcy cases of non-financial institutions since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, involving a massive scale of claims and touching on financial stability, which also concerns the standardization of university-run enterprises, and thus has significant social effect, making it a tough task. The restructuring was as complex as it was extensive, involving an innovative sale-based reorganization model, designed to shield investors from Founder Group’s potential debts or risks, change of actual controller of listed companies, and third-party benefit trust of property rights.AnJie law firm provides special legal services for Ping An Life Insurance, and the leading partners are lawyers Zhan Hao, Chen Jun and Song Ying.

HT Aero’s series A financing（CATEGORIES: Financing; new energyn）

KEY POINTS: HT Aero, an urban air mobility company and an affiliate of Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer Xpeng Motors, raised more than USD500 million in its series A financing, the largest single-tranche fundraising by far for low-altitude flying vehicle space start-ups in Asia. The company says the proceeds will be used to acquire talent and R&D.

AnJie law firm provides legal services for Wuyuan capital, and the leading partners are lawyers Cai hang and Gu Long.

Weichai’s acquisition of Lovol Heavy（CATEGORIES: M&A）

KEY POINTS: Weichai Power, one of the largest diesel engine suppliers in China, bought 39.31% of diversified machinery manufacturer Lovol Heavy Industry in July 2021 from Arbos Technology Group and Qingte, becoming the second-largest shareholder of Lovol Heavy after its holding company Weichai Group.

Six months earlier, aided by the Shandong provincial government, Weichai Group accomplished a strategic reorganisation of Lovol Heavy, holding about 60% of the total issued shares of the company.

AnJie law firm acts as the agent of Arbos technology group, and the leading partners are lawyers Wang Yu and Wang Xuelei.

Bilibili’s secondary Hong Kong listing（CATEGORIES: Hong Kong listing; internet）

KEY POINTS: Bilibili, one of the largest video streaming websites in China, completed its secondary listing on the Hong Kong stock exchange, with a market value of USD2.5 billion. Bilibili is the first company to complete a secondary listing, following the Hong Kong Listing Rules as a “non-grandfathered Greater China issuer” with a weighted voting rights structure.

AnJie law firm acts as the legal adviser of BiliBili China, and the lead partner is lawyer Guo Jinglian.

SPC jurisdiction finding in SEP dispute（CATEGORIES: Intellectual property; jurisdiction dispute）

KEY POINTS:Sharp and OPPO negotiated on the licensing of Sharp’s standard essential patents (SEPs), but no agreement was reached. Sharp then initiated a patent infringement lawsuit against OPPO in Japan and Germany, which OPPO considered violations of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) obligations, and therefore filed a lawsuit with the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court (SIPC), requesting it to make a decision on the global rate for licensing of relevant SEPs owned by Sharp to OPPO.Sharp filed a jurisdictional objection to the case.This is the first time that the Supreme People’s court has made it clear in the standard essential patent litigation that Chinese courts have jurisdiction over the dispute over the global licensing conditions of a package of standard essential patents.The two companies eventually agreed to enter into a patent licensing agreement in October 2021, and ended their global litigation.

AnJie law firm acts as sharp’s agent. At the same time, it also acts as sharp’s wholly-owned subsidiary SAIN Beiji Co., Ltd. together with another law firm. The leading partners are lawyers Liu Qinghui, Wu Li and Chen Zhixing.

 

Regulation continues to be tightening in the insurance industry, with lesser and lesser tolerance for violations of laws and regulations in 2022. Many new law compliance issues are emerging, such as how to understand and apply the corporate governance regulation rules, what are the challenges in compliance management, what are the employment risks and how to implement the PIPL in the insurance industry. Meanwhile, insurance claim disputes ensue from this rapid development of the insurance industry, seeing more cases of dispute over overlapping insurance, assignment of claims, subrogation of insurers, etc.

AnJie will hold an online workshop with respect to the regulatory updates in insurance compliance management and risk control and the new issues and most discussed topics in insurance litigation and arbitration cases. Insurance colleagues are welcome to join us for in-depth discussion and exchange. Looking forward to your active participation.

This workshop will have two sessions respectively on March 23 and 24, hosted by Attorneys Yu Dan and Wang Xuelei, and Attorney Zhan Hao will deliver speeches. In the Session of Most Discussed Topics concerning Insurance Law Compliance Management, Attorneys Xiang Danyang, Li Gang, Cui Yana and Yang Hongquan will make presentations. In the Session of Most Discussed Topics concerning Insurance Litigation and Arbitration, Attorneys Liu Guangfu, Qi Shengmiao, Chen Lei and Yan Bing will make presentations. AnJie Insurance Team will share its undertaking on the latest insurance regulation policies and legal issues and its analysis of the difficult dispute resolution cases handled recently.

Registration method：
1、March 23 – Session of Most Discussed Topics concerning Insurance Law Compliance Management：
https://lnkd.in/gw8h_VGY

2、March 24-Session of Most Discussed Topics concerning Insurance Litigation and Arbitration：
https://lnkd.in/gkGhEuYa