Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) & Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
Arbitration clauses benefit from simplicity. The best arbitration clauses also inform. Rarely are they inventive or creative. This is true for Chinese arbitration, or any other. Arbitration clauses should be tailored to your contract’s purpose and your firm’s needs. Above all, construct your arbitration clause with an eye towards clarity, and not towards partisan advantage.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
A recent reform of the Prior Reporting System will likely impact the procedural rights of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) following domestic arbitration. The 2017 Supreme People’s Court Provisions on the Prior Reporting System dropped on 26 December, 2017. They became effective on 1 January, 2018. The Prior Reporting System originated in 1995. It has been expanded to apply to enforcement of a specific class of awards which have arisen from domestic arbitration proceedings.
The Prior Reporting System has served as an enforcement and annulment process for awards produced from either international arbitration or ‘foreign-related’ arbitration proceedings. Basically, enforcement courts must report ‘up’ to the High People’s Court for that province before they may refuse enforcement. Likewise, High People’s Courts which agreed to refuse enforcement had to report to the Supreme People’s Court. Intermediate courts had served as the first instance forum for enforcement of both domestic and foreign arbitral awards. Deadlines for reporting or reply are sporadically observed. Resultant delays can drag enforcement out a year, or even longer.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
As discussed in the first post in our series, the Chinese arbitration system has matured over the last several years. Foreign parties should favor arbitration clauses in their China deals. Even so, this brings us to yet another question. Should a dispute resolution clause for a China-centered contract select a China-based institution to host the arbitration? Or should a non-Chinese party instead take refuge with regional offshore powerhouse institutions?
Answers will of course vary according to the contemplated contract’s particular circumstances. Nonetheless, Chinese arbitration institutions offer two clear advantages. Chinese courts will facilitate China’s institutional interim measure requests. Also, Chinese institutions offer international service without the cost premium. We explore how these advantages each can impact a dispute. We book-end the advantages with reassurances that Chinese institutions offer truly international arbitration.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
Early this year, Dan Harris of China Law Blog directed his attention to the erstwhile arbitration versus litigation debate. Dan Harris’s position, as of 2014, was that international arbitration was a bad idea when considering China-based enforcement. He seems to have softened his position since then, but without abandoning his priors. Logic and recent available statistics should favor international arbitration in China deals. This is the Introduction to five subsequent posts in a series which addresses the international arbitration process with a particular focus on China.
Dan Harris offered a guarded appraisal for international arbitration as a dispute resolution selection for US companies engaged in China deals:
Arbitration is usually not the best way to go when dealing with Chinese companies, but sometimes it is.
Arbitration acts as the form of alternative dispute resolution most similar to litigation. Just as in litigation, representatives advocate the merits for its party. Just like a court judgment, it is a formal and adversarial process that results in a written decision. A tribunal sits as ‘judges’ and comes to a final decision. But the representatives may be lawyers from any jurisdiction (or not licensed at all). The members of the Tribunal also may be from the United States, Canada, China, or any other country. Unlike litigation, arbitration only rarely allows for appeals on the merits. Most importantly, arbitration removes jurisdiction from a national court and places it in the hands of an institutional arbitration commission. And foreign arbitral awards experience routine enforcement, even in present-day China.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
The post Enterprises in China’s Free Trade Zones Enter 2017 with New Options for Arbitration appeared first on Kluwer Arbitration Blog.
On December 30, 2016, the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) issued a set of new Opinions. It covers an array of matters relating to legal measures to expedite the development of Free Trade Zones. (Opinions on Providing Judicial Protection for the Construction of Pilot Free Trade Zones, December 30, 2016). Among other matters, the SPC sought to open the Free Trade Zones to further options regarding alternative dispute resolution. Remarks made in Article 9 have effectively designated as Foreign Per Se any Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises which are registered in one of 11 current Free- Trade Zones. In three brief paragraphs, the SPC seems to have shifted the landscape for China-based arbitrations. The immediate practical significance of the Opinions may remain humble and limited. In time, the SPC’s Opinions may permit increased deference and jurisdictional purview to foreign tribunals. It also may serve as the beginning of ad hoc arbitration in China.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
First published on IBA, Public Law Committee Newsletter, July 2016
1 Introduction
A few days ago, Mr. Han Bin, the vice director of the Social Capital Cooperation Center of the Ministry of Finance delivered his address to the China First Finance Daily that the Ministry of Finance would soon introduce the third batch of Chinese Public-Private Partnership (“PPP”) programs, following the first batch in 2014 and the second batch in 2015. The overall amount of investment into the public private partnership in China was over 180 billion in RMB Yuan in 2014, the number of programs was only 30, while in 2015, the above two figures topped 650 billion and 206 billion in RMB Yuan respectively.[1] It is estimated that those numbers would come to another break-through this year. Despite the dramatic surge of investment in the public-private partnership sector, public-private partnership faces many dilemmas. Among these, the resolution of disputes concerning the PPP draws the most attention. There are different mechanisms of dispute resolution, but it remains difficult to determine which mechanism is the most dominant for resolving PPP disputes, because there is ambiguity in the definition about the nature of PPP contracts.
2 What is PPP under Chinese Legal Context?
A.Definition
PPP is short for Public-Private Partnership. There is no uniform definition for PPP, but the most commonly known version of the definition comes from United Nations Institute for Raining and Research. In its Report called, “PPP -For sustainable development” the UN describes PPP as “voluntary and collaborative relationships among various actors in both public (State) and private (non-State) sectors, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks.[2] ” The European Commission’s definition of PPP refers to a cooperative relationship between the public sector and the private sector, the purpose of which is to provide service or projects that are traditionally run by the public sector.[3]
In 2014, the year when PPP arrangements in China really took off, National Development and Reform Commission of China issued the Guiding Opinions of the National Development and Reform Commission on Work relating to Public-Private Partnership.[4] The provisions of this policy document define PPP as “[T]he relationship of benefit and risk sharing and long-term cooperation established by the government with private capitals by way of franchise, service purchase, equity partnership or otherwise in order to enhance the public product and service supply capacity and improve supply efficiency.”
B.The scope of public sectors of PPP in China
Starting from the end of 2013, PPP arrangements in China increased rapidly over the years. Over 30 provinces in China have PPP projects. PPP covers a wide range of industrial sectors in China, but PPP projects are concentrated in the railway infrastructure sector. Other industrial sectors in which PPPs have been concluded include :[5]
C.Characteristics of Chinese PPP
The PPP arrangements can be executed through various forms, namely the BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer),[6] BOO (Build-Own-Operate), TOT (Transfer-Operate-Transfer) and ROT (Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer) . The purpose of the PPP program is to better provide public service to the common people, especially in the infrastructure building industry. Parties involved in PPP contracts include administrative agencies, social-capital-backed private investors, enterprises that are set up for operation of PPP projects, banks as the financing parties, and other parties such as the contractors of the projects, and possibly the sub-contractors . [7] And the role of the public sector, most often the administrative agencies in the PPP projects, are multiple, they are parties to the PPP contract, organizers of the PPP program and also the regulator who push the projects forward and ensure the projects are operated in a legal and sustainable manner.
3 Resolving Disputes in PPP Contracts
A.The nature of PPP contracts under Chinese law and policy
The key for the operation of PPP projects or arrangements is the PPP contract itself, which means the contract entered into by the administrative organs and private investors, or civil capital facilitated enterprises. Resolving disputes arising from PPP contracts faces substantial obstacles in China.
Chinese legislation is hierarchical. The Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy, and then comes laws and subsequently administrative statutes. There is yet no special law in China enacted to regulate PPP. At the present time, the fundamental legal documents concerning PPP in China are all at the administrative statutory level, which has lower legal effect than law, for example, the Guiding Opinions of the National Development and Reform Commission on Work relating to Public-Private Partnership. Some documents regulating PPP arrangements are policies promulgated by different ministries or local governments in China, which as such have lower legal effect than law, for example, the Guidelines for Mode of Cooperation for Government and Social Capital (for Trial Implementation). Therefore, these lower-level directives can hardly be directly applied as legal basis in court rulings.
B.Traditionally PPP disputes are subject to Administrative Procedure Law
Noticeably, there is a provision in the Administrative Procedure Law of China which provides lawsuits filed in “cases where an administrative organ is considered to have failed to perform in accordance with the law or as agreed or modify or terminate in violation of laws the government concession operation agreements, land or housing expropriation and compensation agreements or other relevant agreements “ [8] shall be accepted by the judicial court. From the above, it can be indicated that, as a major form of concession agreements in China, PPP contracts are characterized as administrative acts. They are therefore actionable under the Administrative Procedure Law of China.
In Chinese legal practice, traditional PPP contractual disputes are resolved by administrative litigation. For example, in theHuijin Company Ltd. v Government of Changchun City case, Huijinis a water discharge company that entered into contract with the Government of Changchun City to cooperatively exploit water discharge and sewage treatment business in Changchun City. After years of failure in cooperation projects operation, the Government issued a decision to terminate the cooperation. Huijin Company therefore filed an administrative lawsuit against the Government’s action and prevailed in the end. This case is a good example of PPP contractual dispute gets resolved through administrative litigation. The result of this case is among the very few of administrative lawsuits in which a civil party prevailed over the administrative agencies. Winning administrative lawsuits can be challenging for civil parties in China.[9]
Many civil parties lose administrative lawsuits against the administrative agencies. In China, local governments manage the finances of local people’s courts. Currently Chinese courts remain financially dependent upon the local government. Consequently, the judge is often perceived as unable to act as a neutral adjudicator in administrative lawsuits.
C.New approach: PPP disputes should be defined as civil or even commercial disputes
Typical mechanisms of dispute resolution include litigation, mediation, and arbitration. Under Chinese law, litigation is further categorized as either civil litigation or administrative litigation. Unlike what is stipulated in the Administrative Procedure Law, administrative statutes and policies promulgated in the last three or four years have more often characterized PPP contracts as civil contracts and can therefore be resolved through civil or commercial litigation, arbitration and mediation, such as the Notice of Promotion and Application of PPP Model issued by the Ministry of Finance, the Contract Guidelines for PPP Projects issued by the National Development and Reform Committee, and Measures for the Administration Procurement Concerning PPP Projects issued by the Ministry of Finance. The difference between civil contracts and administrative contracts is that parties in the civil contracts are equal in legal status, while parties in the administrative contracts are not, since public power is involved in the administrative contracts. Administrative contractual disputes can only be resolved by filing lawsuits to be heard before the administrative tribunal.
Recent judicial practice in China also shows a trend to define PPP contractual disputes as civil or even commercial disputes rather than administrative disputes. Taking one of the Fifth Pile of Guideline Cases issued by the Supreme People’s Court of China as an example, Case No. 53 is a PPP contractual dispute arising from contract between a local bank, a local sewage treatment company, and an SOE. In the decision of the court, it can be inferred that that all legal relationships were decided to be of a civil contractual nature, even when administrative agencies[10] are involved.
As alternatives from litigation, arbitration and mediation could be introduced to resolve PPP disputes. According to the Arbitration Law of China, contractual disputes are arbitrable, just as are other disputes over rights and interests in property between citizens, legal persons and other organizations that are “equal subjects.” Chinese Mediation law contains similar provisions. Because the “administrative” characteristics of the PPP contract, the parties to the contract are not “equal subjects,”[11] so no explicit legal basis permits PPP contracts to be arbitrated or mediated under Chinese law. Only civil and commercial contractual disputes, where the parties to which are “equal subjects,” are entitled to arbitration or mediation. Due to the more tolerant and flexible judicial practice in China, characterizing PPP contracts as civil or commercial contracts would grant a new approach for PPP contractual disputes to be arbitrated or mediated.
4 Can Arbitration Be Applied to Settlement of PPP Contractual Disputes
If PPP contractual disputes could be defined as civil or commercial contracts, rather than administrative contracts, then such disputes could be resolved by arbitration. And settling PPP contractual disputes through arbitration has many advantages.
A.The feasibility of PPP contract arbitration
Theoretically speaking, there are three different kinds of academic opinions regarding the nature of PPP contract. Namely, the public law contact opinion, the private law contract opinion, and the third one as a hybrid of the previous two. The mainstream voice in Chinese PPP industry is the third opinion, which agrees that PPP contracts are both public law and private law in nature. Especially when the principal PPP contract contains many sub-contracts, the nature of these contracts can vary, and particular situations in different contracts must be taken into account. The adjudicators in specific cases concerning PPP related disputes have wide discretion in deciding the nature of the contracts and whether or how to distinguish the public aspects from the private aspects.
Traditionally, administrative agencies are not equal subjects in civil or commercial contracts. Now, with the accumulation of judicial practice, PPP practitioners have discerned that it is possible to makea distinction in PPP contracts as to which part of the contracts is administrative and which part is civil or commercial. When an administrative party acts as a cooperator instead of a regulator in the PPPcontract, the contract is more of a civil or commercial one entered into by equal subjects, thus disputes arising therefrom can be settled by arbitration. In the Guidelines for Mode of Cooperation forGovernment and Social Capital, Article 28 provides that interested parties to the PPP projects are entitled to apply for arbitration or file lawsuits in front of the People’s Court if they are not able to settle the disputes through amicable negotiation. Though the Guideline is still at trial, it affirms the arbitrability of PPP related disputes.
B.The advantages of resolving PPP contractual disputes through arbitration
Resolving PPP contractual disputes by arbitration is not only feasible, but also advantageous. According to statistical research in 2015, the rate of final conclusion of PPP contracts was actually very low. Characterizing PPP contracts as administrative contracts hampers private businesses’ investment enthusiasm. A major concern is that in administrative lawsuits, private parties seldom prevail. However, if PPP contractual disputes are characterized as civil or commercial contractual disputes, they can be settled through arbitration instead of litigation. Arbitration offers advantages over litigation in many aspects. Resolving PPP contractual disputes requires higher levels of special and technical knowledge. Parties can choose professional and specialized practitioners in the PPP industry to decide the case. Arbitrators with professional PPP related knowledge are more appropriate candidates to decide the case than judges, because very often judges are not equipped with professional knowledge in a specific field like the PPP industry. And in return, bring PPP related disputes to arbitration also reduces the considerable heavy amount of caseload of judges.
Aside from considerations of professionalism and technical expertise, resolving PPP contractual disputes through arbitration strengthens and safeguards neutrality. Unlike the Chinese judicial system, there are no hierarchical structures within arbitration institutions. This assures the neutrality and independence of the arbitration tribunal’s award. . Therefore, settling disputes through arbitration guarantees more neutrality and safeguards the ultimate fairness of the decision.
5 Conclusion
In China, there is no specific law on PPP so far, however, many administrative agencies have published circulars regarding PPP, and in these administrative policies, the arbitrability and civil or commercial nature of PPP contracts are affirmed. In addition, in international practice, PPP related disputes are defined as civil and commercial contracts, in particular in countries where the PPP has developed into a mature stage, special arbitration institutions are established to resolve PPP related disputes. With the increasing number of PPP related disputes ever since 2014, defining PPP contractual disputes as civil and commercial disputes and resolving them through arbitration become a voice for reform of relevant PPP legislation in China. It seems that Chinese government policy and judicial practice are one step ahead in PPP regulation. Chinese PPP practitioners are looking forward to the promulgation of a special law to regulate PPP related disputes, which would affirm the arbitrability of PPP contracts as civil or commercial contracts entered into by “equal subject” parties.
Notes：
Arthur Dong is a founding partner of AnJie Law Firm in Beijing, Officer of IBA Public Law Committee. Email: dongxiao@anjielaw.com. The author thanks Darren Mayberry and Jocelyn Li, associates in AnJie Law Firm’s Beijing office, for their invaluable assistance with this article.
[1] China First Finance Daily, 12 May, 2016, available at:
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-05-12/doc-ifxsehvu8776172.shtml
[2] United Nations Institute for Raining and Research, (2000) “PPP–For sustainable development”.
[3] European Commission. (2003) The European Commission Guidance for successful PPP.
[4 ]Ministry of Finance, Document serial number: FaGaiTouZi [2014] NO. 2724.
[5] Xiao Chen, Legal Framework of PPP in China, 2010 master degree thesis in economic law of China University of Political Science and Law.
[6] Supra 4.
[7] LihuaXu, (2015) Prevention of Legal Risks under PPP Model, Modern SOE Research, Vol. 12, No.2.
[8] Article 12 (11) of the Administrative Procedure Law of China.
[9]Jinmin Wang, (2015) Can Civil Parties Prevail in PPP lawsuits, Legal System, Vol. 12, No.1.
[10] SOE in China is count as administrative agency, since leaders in the SOE have “Bianzhi”, which stands for authorized identity of civil servants.
[11] Article 2, Arbitration Law of China.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
On January 10, 2017, Singapore enacted yet another landmark legal reform, renewing its status as a leading seat for international arbitration. Singapore has completely abolished the torts of maintenance and champerty. This will allow parties to international arbitration to engage attorneys on a contingency fee basis. In addition, Singapore has expressly declared that third-party funding agreements are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy. Third-party funding arrangements allow parties to borrow money from certified lenders to pay their lawyers or experts in advance, but at the cost of a significant portion of the expected recovery. Once the reform comes into effect, the changes will further solidify its status as international arbitration hub.
Here we restate the objectives of Singapore’s Civil Law Amendment Bill, after which we examine the effect of the bill on contingency fee arrangements. We explore comparisons with other jurisdictions throughout. We will also address the most remarkable effect of the Civil Law Bill, Singapore’s resounding affirmation of third-party funding. We then examine the framework under which the Civil Law Act will soon delegate its regulation of third-party funding to the Ministry of Law.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
What happens when the parties to a contract have chosen an arbitration institution, but not specified the number of arbitrators to resolve the dispute? In effect, the parties have already chosen the number of arbitrators, because arbitration institutions have provisions for choosing the number of arbitrators when the arbitration clause is silent. If the parties adopted a summary/expedited procedure, they have elected a single arbitrator.
Institutions take varied positions on the implied number of arbitrators assigned to a tribunal. All authorities agree that the choice is only between one and three arbitrators.
The graph below displays the positions taken by the rules of four institutions, CIETAC, BAC, SIAC, and HKIAC, as well as the UNCITRAL rules. The implied number of arbitrators are given, and whether the determinate implication of number is presumptive or firm is indicated. Note that the implied number below do not reflect separate and distinct Summary/Expedited Procedures.
Authored by Arthur Dong (dongxiao@anjielaw.com) and Darren Mayberry (darren.mayberry@anjielaw.com) at AnJie Law Firm
On October 27, 2016, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) held its annual China Roadshow in Shanghai. SIAC is a premier global arbitration forum and institution that caters particularly to Chinese, Indian, and other ASEAN legal users. The initial panel included arbitration luminaries such as Chan Hock Seng, Steven Lim, John Zou, SIAC’s Deputy Registrar Kevin Nash, and AnJie Law Firm Partner and specialist on arbitration enforcement Arthur Dong.
SIAC’s China Head, Sophia Feng, convened the distinguished panel to discuss SIAC’s innovations in its 2016 Rules, particularly its bold Early Dismissal provision. Rule 29 permits the Tribunal to dismiss claims or defenses which are “manifestly” either “without legal merit” or “outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” Drawn from ICSID, SIAC is nonetheless the first arbitration institution to enact an Early (or Summary) Dismissal provision in its commercial arbitration institutional rules.
The other panelists eagerly requested Arthur’s professional outlook on whether Chinese courts would be willing to recognize an Award anchored in a resolution by Early Dismissal. In short, Arthur is optimistic. Arthur noted that China is a signatory to the New York Convention. As such, China takes its obligations to enforce foreign Awards very seriously. Arthur reminded that China has a strong track record on enforcement. Furthermore, China will avoid delving into the substantive merits underlying any arbitration Award. Chinese courts respect that the Tribunal’s Award is the last word on the application of the facts to the law in any arbitration. Therefore, Chinese courts will respect Awards where the Early Dismissal provision had a major impact.
The distinguished panelists considered enforcement issues globally. Although summary judgment features prominently in common law jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, civil law countries rarely exhibit any examples of such an early dismissal device. The panelists considered the danger of Early Dismissal in light of the New York Convention’s requirement that parties be afforded a “fair opportunity to present their cases.” Reassurance came, at least to an extent, by attention to the limiting language of Early Dismissal: the remedy of dismissal could only apply to matters of pure law or jurisdiction, and the standard required “manifest” burden. Any admixture of fact and law would require treatment of the issue under a full hearing. There was some concern about the vagueness of what might prove ‘manifest.’
In any case, SIAC Deputy Registrar Kevin Nash anticipates that few resolutions of the Early Dismissal procedure would entirely dispose of any matter, except perhaps when jurisdiction or legal grounds were facially and clearly wrong. This expectation appears sound. Early Dismissal was designed to narrow the issues before the hearing. As such, it would prove an absolute bar to only the most frivolous or mistaken claims.
In addition to Early Dismissal, the panel discussed the Emergency Arbitrator provision. Arthur Dong pointed out that these will be useful to China-based users. Normally, interim measures are unavailable in China, unless the host institution is also based in China. Therefore, the breadth and scope of SIAC’s Emergency Arbitrator provisions may allow China-based users to accomplish what they otherwise might not through interim measures.
Overall, Arthur Dong remains optimistic that Chinese courts will respect and enforce SIAC Awards, even when they rely on innovations under SIAC’s 2016 Rules.
In a judgment handed down on 15 September 2016, the Honourable Judge Waksman QC, sitting in the High Court in London, ruled that arbitration courts could award third-party financing costs as “other costs” collectible under the Arbitration Act of 1996. The full circumstances and facts surrounding the opinion are currently unavailable, as we await release of a detailed and final decision.
Here is what we do know. The case involved a contract dispute concerning operation of an offshore drilling platform. The two parties were Norscot Rig Management and Essar Oilfield Services. Norscot applied for third-party financing to fund its action against Essar. The arbitration Tribunal awarded Norscot at least part of its third-party financing costs.
Prior decisions in other common law jurisdictions have approved the existence and validity of third-party funding generally in the context of litigation. In Bayens v Kinross Gold Corporation, 2013 ONSC 4974, the trustee plaintiffs, acting on behalf of the Musician’s Pension Fund of Canada, moved for approval of an underlying litigation funding agreement designed primarily to protect the class counsel from the risk of an indemnity where the Defendant won an award on adverse costs. The Ontario Superior Court approved the legality of the agreement, specifying that in litigation all such arrangements would need to be disclosed and receive court approval. The recent London High Court ruling took the matter a step further, awarding some portion of the applicant’s costs for the expense of the third-party funding arrangement itself.
As we await the final published decision, we anticipate Judge Waksman’s reasoning might in some way addresses one of the following three questions.
Questions:
1) Since the United Kingdom is a leading ‘costs-follows-the-event’ jurisdiction, would that make its High Court justices more likely to acknowledge the reasonableness of recovery of third-party funding costs? Will higher courts from ‘bear-your-own-costs’ jurisdictions (such as the United States) wind up approaching third-party funding costs more skeptically?
2) Are third-party costs presumptively unreasonable, but only available in specific cases where the facts especially merit their recovery? Or will third-party funding costs be seen as an increasing reality in a world where transactional financing costs are already prevalent and recoverable?
3) Should a Tribunal’s award of third-party funding costs be explicitly subject to appeal, such that a party awarded third-party funding fees must know that this award will become a roadblock to immediate enforcement? And if so, should courts of the seat of the arbitration bifurcate enforcement of the ‘normal’ and special ‘third-party funding’ costs awards, and allow enforcement of the rest of the award while the third-party funding portion of the award awaits and undergoes the lengthy. and also perhaps expensive process of judicial review?
4) Will Chinese courts actively support third-party funding schemes? Third-party financing arrangements have already made an appearance, particularly in off-shore arbitrations where the fees are relatively high. Will courts view it as beneficial to resolve more commercial disputes? Or, will courts believe it would encourage more litigation/arbitration or perhaps discourage settlement?
